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INTRODUCTION 
I start out, as have many others, from the deep split among Ameri-
can feminists between "sameness" and "difference."2 The driving 
force behind the mid-twentieth-century resurgence of American femi-
nism was an insistence on the fundamental similarity of men and 
women and, hence, their essential equality. Betty Friedan comes to 
mind as an enormously influential housewife whose focus on men and 
women as individuals made her intensely hostile to gender 
stereotyping. 3 
Mid-century feminism, now often referred to somewhat derisively 
as assimilationism, focused on providing opportunities to women in 
realms traditionally preserved for men.4 In the 1980s two phenomena 
have shifted feminists' attention from assimilationists' focus on how 
individual women are like men to a focus on gender differences, on 
how women as a group differ from men as a group. The first is the 
feminization of poverty, which dramatizes the chronic and increasing 
economic vulnerability of women.5 Feminists now realize that the as-
2. A wide range of scholars has identified the task of resolving this split as the major cha!· 
lenge for modem feminism. See, e.g., Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism, 13 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOCY. 405 (1988); Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, 
Woman's Place.· The Rhetoric of Women's History, 15 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1988); Boris, Looking at 
Women's Historians Looking at "Difference," 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1987); Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Scott, Deconstructing Equality Versus 
Difference.· Or, the Uses of Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEM. STUD. 33 (1988); 
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988); Minow, Rights of One's Own 
(Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REv. 1084 (1985). Christine Littleton offers an especially interest-
ing and insightful analysis of how various groups of legal feminists are distributed across "same· 
ness" and "difference." See Littleton, supra, at 1292-301. Robin West implicitly discounts 
"sameness" feminists by omitting them from her description of feminist thought. See West, 
supra, at 13-15. This position is necessarily entailed in West's search for "a jurisprudence built 
upon feminist insights into women's true nature," id. at 3-4, a formulation that shows the influ-
ence of her biological essentialism, id. at 2-3. 
It is worth noting that the perception that sameness and difference themes are necessarily in 
opposition is relatively recent. During the debate over suffrage, sameness and difference argu-
ments were used "in the same breath by the same people, with no perception of conflict." Letter 
from Suzanne Lebsock to author (Nov. 29, 1988) (on file with author). Why these themes came 
to be perceived as conflicting and whether this modern tendency should be perpetuated are im-
portant questions for contemporary theorists. I am grateful for this point to Suzanne Lebsock. 
3. B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). For a discussion of the breadth of the 
resurgence of feminism in the 1960s, see THE NEW FEMINISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA (J. Sochen ed. 1971). It should be noted that Friedan has substantially changed her 
focus. See B. FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE 38-41, 83-87 (1981). 
4. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the 
Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 606 (1977). Wasserstrom's comparison of sex to eye color is 
often criticized by feminists of difference, who argue that something would be lost if sex were 
treated as a factor as irrelevant as eye color. See, e.g., E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 22-23 (1980); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the Ma-
ternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1139 (1986); Littleton, supra note 2, 
at 1291. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 119-25. 
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similationists' traditional focus on gender-neutrality may have ren-
dered women more vulnerable to certain gender-related disabilities 
that have important economic consequences. 6 The second phenome-
non that plays a central role in the current feminist imagination is that 
of career women "choosing" to abandon or subordinate their careers 
so they can spend time with their small children.7 These phenomena 
highlight the fact that deep-seated social differences continue to en-
courage men and women to make quite different choices with respect 
to work and family. Thus, "sameness" scholars are increasingly con-
fronted by the existence of gender differences. 
Do these challenges to assimilationism prove that we should stop 
trying to kid ourselves and admit the "real" differences between men 
and women, as the popular press drums into us day after day, and as 
the "feminism of difference" appears to confirm?8 Do such phenom-
ena mean that feminists' traditional focus on gender-neutrality is a 
bankrupt ideal? I will argue no on both counts, taking an approach 
quite different from that ordinarily taken by feminists on the sameness 
side of the spectrum. "Sameness" feminists usually have responded to 
the feminists of difference by reiterating their basic insight that indi-
vidual men and women can be very similar. While true, this is not an 
adequate response to the basic insight of "difference" feminists: that 
gender exists, that men and women differ as groups. In this article, I 
try to speak to feminists of difference on their own terms. While I take 
gender seriously, I disagree with the description of gender provided by 
difference feminists. 
I begin in Part I by challenging the widely influential description of 
gender advocated by Carol Gilligan. I suggest that Gilligan's descrip-
tion of "women's voice" is less a description of women's psychology 
than an attempt to attribute to women two influential critiques of con-
temporary Western culture. One is the critique of traditional Western 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 172-74. 
7. See A. CARDOZO, SEQUENCING (1986); Rimer, Sequencing: Putting Careers on Hold, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1988, at A21, col. 1; Hickey, The Dilemma of Having It All, WASH. LAW., 
May-June 1988, at 38; Fierst, Careers and Kids, Ms. MAGAZINE, May 1988, at 62; Kantrowitz, 
A Mother's Choice, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1988, at 46; E. WoLGASf, supra note 4, at 156. 
8. See, e.g., Barber, Beyond the Feminist Mystique, NEW REPUBLIC, July 11, 1983, at 26, 
passim; Friedan, How To Get the Women's i'.1ovement Moving Again, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985 
(Magazine), at 26; Salholtz, Feminism's Identity Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1988, at 58; 
Brubach, Men Will Be Men, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1983, at 118, 124; Ciulla, Corporate 
Leadership: Try a Little Tenderness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 74; Lubin, 
Superwomen of the Financial World, WORKING WOMAN, Sept. 1984, at 161, 166; Gilligan, Why 
Should a Woman Be More Like a Man?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, June 1982, at 68; Hickey, supra 
note 7, passim; see also responses published under the title of Parenting & the Law, WASH. LAW., 
Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 46; D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 113 (1986); cf. B. 
FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE, supra note 3, at 86. 
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epistemology. I argue that it is incorrect as a matter of intellectual 
history to claim, as have Gilligan and others, that the twentieth cen-
tury's shift to a more contextualizing, antiformalist, and relativizing 
form of discourse constitutes a rejection of absolutist "male" episte-
mology in favor of "women's voice." The second critique Gilligan 
claims for women, the critique of possessive individualism, presents 
more subtle issues. Unlike the critique of traditional epistemology, the 
critique of possessive individualism has traditionally been associated 
with women. Gilligan's description of gender differences reclaims this 
critique for women through an updated version of the Victorian ideol-
ogy of domesticity, whose attraction for modem feminists lies in its 
perceived potential "to transform our polity and its underlying as-
sumptions [away] from the alienated world of atomistic competition . 
• • • "
9 This critique of individualism is one well worth exploring. But 
its power is undermined when modem feminists adopt domesticity's 
peculiarly domesticated version of the critique. The perils of modem 
domesticity become apparent in an analysis of the recent Title VII case 
of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. 10 This case provides ample evidence of how domesticity's 
critique of possessive individualism serves to marginalize both women 
and the critique itself. 
While Part I challenges the description of gender differences of-
fered by Gilligan feminists, it does not deny the existence of gender 
differences. Gender differences do exist: that is, men as a group differ 
from women as a group not only on the basis of biological "sex" differ-
ences, but on the basis of social "gender" differences. 11 What I reject 
9. Comments of Paul J. Spiegelman, James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Dis· 
course, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 36 (1985) [hereinaf· 
ter A Conversation]. 
10. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), ajfd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
11. Some influential feminists have denied the importance of the distinction between sex and 
gender by arguing in effect that most (or all) of the important differences between men and 
women are biological as opposed to social. See, e.g., E. WOLGAST, supra note 4, at 26. Perhaps 
the most influential author to take this position currently is Robin West. See West, supra note 2, 
at 2-3. West stands by her claim that the behavior differences between men and women are 
biological, not social even when, in the last pages of her article, she modifies her "separation" 
thesis with an.admission that men as well as women are focused on connection as well as separa-
tion. To me this suggests that a focus on connection is not determined by biology (le., sex) but 
by socialization (le., gender). West, however, assumes that if men are "connective," there must 
be a biological reason: she attributes their connectivity to the fact of men's attachment to their 
mothers through the umbilical cord. Are we to conclude that women are more "connective" 
than men because, whereas men spend only nine months biologically connected to another 
human being, women who become mothers spend another nine months for each child they bear 
- more if they nurse and we count nursing as "connective" (as West does)? Are adoptive 
mothers then less "connective" than biological mothers? 
West's biological determinism, in addition to singling out biological mothers who nurse as the 
ideal life form, leads her to the somewhat strange assertion that one of the unique "connective" 
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is Gilligan's description of gender differences, which I think is inaccu-
rate and potentially destructive. 
The chief strength of the feminism of difference is its challenge to 
what have been called male norms. Part II demonstrates how these 
norms can be challenged without resort to domesticity. I begin from 
Catharine MacKinnon's description of gender as a system of power 
relations. While MacKinnon focuses on sexuality, I return to a more 
traditional topic: the relationship between work and family responsi-
bilities. I argue that these issues are at the core of the contemporary 
gender system, which systematically enriches men at the expense of 
women and children. Problems such as the feminization of poverty 
stem in substantial part from a wage-labor system premised on an 
ideal worker with no family responsibilities. Experiences of the past 
decade have shown that women can only enter the labor force without 
insisting on a redefinition of the ideal worker at the expense of failing 
to meet the ideal. 
Yet the gendered structure of wage labor is not being challenged. 
More astonishing, difference feminists celebrate a women's culture 
that encourages women to "choose" economic marginalization and 
celebrate that choice as a badge of virtue. The notion that women 
"choose" to become marginalized (nonideal) workers clouds the fact 
that all workers currently are limited to two unacceptable choices: the 
traditional male life pattern or women's traditional economic vulnera-
bility. Wage labor does not have to be structured in this way. Chang-
ing it should be a central thrust of a feminist program. 
In Part III, I continue to develop this alternative vision of gender. 
I first discuss the rejection by MacKinnon and others of the traditional 
feminist goal of gender neutrality. Its critics have argued that gender 
neutrality mandates a blindness to gender realities and so inhibits at-
tempts to help women victimized by gender. I redefine the traditional 
experiences for women is sexual intercourse. Whom are they connected to? Are not men by 
definition also connected? And in what sense is menstruation "connection," as West claims? 
West does not seem to realize that she is dealing not with biology but with metaphor. She 
uses metaphors drawn from human experience to argue that experiences (notably childbirth) lead 
human beings to certain values, notably "connectivity." Isn't that true only if those people inter-
pret the biological experiences West discusses in the same way she does? Pregnancy indeed rep-
resents an opportunity for human beings to recognize the beauty of their connections with others. 
Indeed, for me, one of the unadvertised beauties of pregnancy was the opportunity to feel a 
connection not only with the baby, but with the human community at large. Pregnancy, I kept 
saying, was like hitchhiking - it brought out the best in people, their most caring and communal 
side. But the point is that women can interpret this aspect of pregnancy (and all others) differ-
ently: many professional women interpret strangers' demonstrations of their sense that they too 
"own" a pregnant woman's tummy as invasive and demeaning. Moreover, women themselves 
sometimes experience pregnancies (particularly unwanted ones) as invasive. Nonetheless, some 
of the most influential feminists of difference have shared West's biological determinism. 
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goal, which in fact does not require neutrality, or blindness, with re-
spect to gender, but rather advocates a consistent refusal to institution-
alize a correlation between gender roles and biological sex differences. 
Thus redefined, the traditional goal has continuing validity, since insti-
tutionalizing a correlation between gender and sex necessarily rein-
forces gender stereotypes and the oppressive gender system as a whole. 
Moreover, the traditional goal does not preclude helping women dis-
advantaged by their adherence to gender roles, since such women can 
be protected in a sex-neutral fashion by protecting all people (regard-
less of biology) who are victimized by gender. 
The article concludes by detailing the limitations of Gilligan's de-
scription of gender differences. This discussion responds to comments 
from some who have heard my analysis and then assumed that I can-
not really be denying women's "different voice." I stress that, though 
I am not denying the existence of gender, I am denying the validity of 
the description of women's voice that Gilligan has provided. In par-
ticular I reject Gilligan's core claim that women are focused on rela-
tionships while men are not. To the extent this claim pinpoints actual 
gender differences, I argue it merely reflects the oppressive realities of 
the current gender system. Beyond that, Gilligan's claim is inaccurate 
and serves to perpetuate our traditional blindness to the ways in which 
men are nurturing and women are competitive and power-seeking. 
I. THE FEMINISM OF DIFFERENCE 
A. Introduction 
The most influential source for the feminism of difference is Carol 
Gilligan's book, in which Gilligan argues that women speak "in a dif-
ferent voice."I2 Women are portrayed as nurturers, defined by their 
relationships and focused on contextual thinking; men are depicted as 
abstract thinkers, defined by individual achievement. We should listen 
to women's "voice," argue Gilligan and her followers, because 
12. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 24-63 (1982). Gilligan is only the most famous of 
the scholars who have defined gender in psychological terms. Her findings parallel, and presum· 
ably were influenced by, the work of Jean Baker Miller, see J.B. MILLER, TOWARD A NEW 
PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2d ed. 1986); see also N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OP 
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978). All three authors 
focus in different ways on "connectedness" as a crucial (if not the crucial) gender difference. See 
c. GILLIGAN, supra, at 8-9; J.B. MILLER, supra, at 83, 148 n.l; N. CHODOROW, supra, at 90-91, 
167-70, 178-79. But only Chodorow seems clearly to recognize that what she is talking about is 
the psychological construction of gender and its costs for women. Id. at 213-19. 
It is important to place Gilligan's work into historical context. Though I take issue with her 
conclusions about women's voice, I endorse her fundamental motivation, namely to reverse the 
previous practice of ignoring women altogether, or treating any differences between men and 
women as reflecting women's inadequacy. Gilligan's primary contribution was to articulate a 
modem challenge to "male norms." 
February 1989] Deconstructing Gender 803 
women's culture offers the basis for a transformation of our society, a 
transformation based on the womanly values of responsibility, connec-
tion, selflessness, and caring, rather than on separation, autonomy, 
and hierarchy.13 
One reason why the feminism of difference has proved so persua-
sive is that it has claimed for women two of the central critiques of 
twentieth-century thought. In a strain of argument particularly popu-
lar in law reviews, feminists characterize traditional Western episte-
mology as "male" and identify the twentieth-century critique of that 
epistemology as an integral part of "women's voice."14 Gilligan and 
her followers also identify with women a critique of possessive individ-
ualism whose implications have been spelled out in EEOC v. Sears. 15 
B. The New Epistemology as Women~ Voice 
Gilligan's description is often presented as a rediscovery of obvious 
differences between men and women we knew about all along. 16 In 
fact, even feminists of difference disagree about what are the "obvi-
ous" differences between men and women. Gilligan's description of 
women has been so widely adopted17 that it is easy to overlook the fact 
13. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 19-21, 64-66, 70-71, 82-83. 
14. See, e.g., Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 
(1986); Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist 
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N. MEX. L. R.Ev. 613 (1986); Kornhauser, The Rhetoric 
of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 
(1987); Areen, A Need for Caring (Book Review), 86 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1067, 1073 (1988). 
15. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
16. Feminists of difference often set up a rhetorical structure in which their willingness to 
admit "real" differences is contrasted with the ideological commitment of assimilationists to deny 
them. See, e.g., D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 8, at 113. 
17. Gilligan's work has spawned a huge literature. "[T]he very name Gilligan has become a 
buzzword in both academic and feminist circles." Watstein, Psychology in 4 THE WOMEN'S 
ANNUAL 167, 178 (S. Pritchard ed. 1984). Some examples: in psychology, M.F. BELENKY, B. 
MCVICKER CLINCHY, N.R. GOLDBERGER & J.M. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING xi, 
7-8 (1986); Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality, 53 HARV. EDUC. 
REV. 125 (1983); Sassen, Success Anxiety in Women: A Constructivist Interpretation of Its Source 
and Its Significance, 50 HARV. EDUC. R.Ev. 13, 18 (1980); in social theory: K. FERGUSON, THE 
FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 159-60 (1984); in ethical theory: N. NODDINGS, CAR-
ING (1984); in literary criticism: s. O'BRIEN, WILLA CATHER: THE EMERGING VOICE (1987); 
in the media: Van Gelder, Carol Gilligan: Leader for a Different Kind of Future, Ms. MAGA-
ZINE, Jan. 1984, at 37 (Gilligan was Ms. Magazine's "Woman of the Year"); Shreve, Viva la 
Difference, in MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, June 21, 1988, at 15 (of transcript); in the law: Areen, 
supra note 14; Finley, supra note 4, at 1118, 1154, 1158, 1161, 1166-67; Karst, Woman's Consti-
tution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 480-508; Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 507-18; Menkel-Meadow, 
Portia in a Different Voice.· Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 39, 41-42 (1985); Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's 
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. l, 15 n.37 (1986); Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: 
Promise & Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRAC. 21, 24 n.14 (1984); Scales, 
supra note 14, at 1374; Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the 
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 613-18 (1986); Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring 
Quotas After Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in 
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that other feminists of difference have offered a sharply different ver-
sion of women's true nature. Some radical feminists, more influential 
ten years ago than today, have espoused a view of women dramatically 
different from Gilligan's. Often using witch imagery, they stress 
women's intuition, their sexual power, and their alliance with deep 
forces of irrationality.is 
This portrait of woman as id derives largely from the pre-modem 
stereotype of woman as the "weaker vessel."19 Before the mid-eight-
eenth century, women were viewed not only as physically weaker than 
men; their intellectual and moral frailty meant they needed men's gui-
dance to protect them from the human propensity for evil. Women's 
intense sexuality and their fundamental irrationality meant they were 
in need of outside control, because women in their weakness could be 
easily tempted. The darkest expression of the traditional view that 
women unsupervised quickly slipped into collusion with evil was the 
persecution (during some periods, massive in scale) of women as 
witches.20 
This traditional stereotype of women crystallized after the early 
modem period into some traditional truths about women. As the phi-
losophes of the Enlightenment celebrated logic and reason, women's 
intellectual inferiority came to be expressed as an inability to engage in 
rigorous, abstract thinking. The Enlightenment also celebrated reason 
over emotion, and women's pre-modem alliance with the devil was 
transmuted into the view that women's limited ability for rational 
thought meant they were fundamentally emotional creatures. 
Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RE.v. 339, 342 (1985). The grip of 
Gilligan's description on legal scholars is such that an editor of one women's law review to which 
this article was submitted indicated she had never before seen an article that disagreed with 
Gilligan. Telephone conversation with Carrie Newkirk, Article Editor of the BERKELEY WO-
MEN'S LAW JOURNAL (Sept. 20, 1988). Perhaps Schneider's thoughtful footnote may mark the 
beginning of a less deferential approach to Gilligan's work. See Schneider, supra, at 616 n.140. 
18. See, e.g., M. DALY, PURE LUST xii, 4-7 (1984); M. DALY, GYN/EcOLOGY 220-22 
(1978). The French feminists combine elements of domesticity with elements of this earlier im-
age of women. See, e.g., L. !RIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH Is NOT ONE 29, 208-11 (1985). 
19. For an introduction, see A. FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL 1-6 (1984); N. COTT, THE 
BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 201-04 
(1977). 
20. C. KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN THE SHAPE OF A WOMAN 154-81 (1987); J. DEMOS, EN· 
TERTAINING SATAN 60-64, 197-209, 394-95 (1982); J. KLAITS, SERVANTS OF SATAN 51-59 
(1985); G.R. QUAIFE, WANTON WENCHES AND WAYWARD WIVES 14-15, 182-83 (1979); L. 
ULRICH, GOOD WIVES 96-99, 106-12 (1980); Bloch, Untangling the Roots of Modern Sex Roles: 
A Survey of Four Centuries of Change, 4 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOCY. 237, 240-41 
(1978); Demos, Husbands and Wives, reprinted in J. FRIEDMAN & w. SHADE, OUR AMERICAN 
SISTERS: WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 41-42 (1982). Pre-nineteenth-century 
women also had a very different relationship to commerce (which itself was not yet capitalistic). 
See Ulrich, Housewife and Gadder: Themes of Self-Sufficiency and Community in Eighteenth-
Century New England, in TO TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY (C. Groneman & M.B. Norton eds. 
1987). 
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These stereotypes have provided the link for many feminists of dif-
ference between women and the critique of traditional Western episte-
mology. 21 This critique, which I have elsewhere called the new 
epistemology,22 consists of a broad and diverse intellectual movement 
that rejects a range of long-standing Western verities, some dating to 
the Enlightenment, and others all the way back to Plato. Perhaps the 
core element of the new epistemology is its rejection of an absolute 
truth accessible through rigorous, logical manipulation of abstrac-
tions. 23 Feminists of difference have characterized the new epistemol-
ogy with women's voice, noting that women traditionally have been 
thought to eschew abstraction for sensitivity to context, and to eschew 
logic for a faith in emotion and intuition as tools of thought. 24 
On closer inspection, however, the traditional stereotype of women 
as overly emotional and incapable of rational, abstract thought is quite 
different from the critique proffered by the new epistemology: femi-
nists are being highly selective in the aspects of the traditional stereo-
type they choose to stress. It is true there are some similarities 
between the traditional stereotype of women and the new epistemol-
ogy. Both share a sense of the limitations of pure logic and a faith in 
contextual thinking.25 But feminists of difference submerge the fact 
that the thinkers who have developed the new epistemology have, by 
and large, been cerebral and detached in the extreme. Neither they 
nor the new epistemology fits the traditional stereotype of women as 
too emotional for sustained rational thought. What the new epis-
temologists are talking about is a new kind of rationality, one not so 
closely tied to abstract, transcendental truths, one that does not ex-
clude so much of human experience as Western rationality tradition-
ally has done. The ideal they propose represents a broadening of 
traditional intellectual life, whereas the traditional caricature of 
women as emotional and irrational represents a formal marginaliza-
tion of those characteristics of human personality that the Western 
tradition has devalued. 26 
21. See generally A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST PoLmcs AND HUMAN NATURE 364-84 (1983); A 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE ACADEMY (E. Langland & w. Gove eds. 1981); s. HARDING, 
THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986); C. MCMILLAN, WOMEN, REASON, AND NA-
TURE (1982); Vickers, Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of Femi-
nist Research, in FEMINISM IN CANADA: FROM PRESSURE TO PoLmCS (G. Ginn & A. Miles 
eds. 1982). 
22. See Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the 
New Longdel/s, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (1987). 
23. Id. at 432-34. 
24. See sources cited supra note 14. 
25. See, e.g .• W.W. BARTLEY, III, WITTGENSTEIN 48, 139-58, 187-91 (1985). 
26. The most sophisticated of the feminist scholars who link traditional rationalism with 
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Thus, this attempt to rehabilitate traditional stereotypes as 
"women's voice," and to associate women's voice with the new episte-
mology, fails to come to terms with the extent to which the gender 
stereotypes were designed to marginalize women. These stereotypes 
no doubt articulated some values shunted aside by Western culture. 
But the circumstances of their birth mean they presented a challenge 
to predominant W estem values that was designed to fail, and to 
marginalize women in the process. 
At a simpler level, the attempt to claim the new epistemology for 
women is unconvincing simply because the new epistemology has been 
developed largely by men. These include philosophers from Frederick 
Nietzsche and the American pragmatists to Martin Heidegger and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, all of whom helped develop the movement's cri-
tique of absolutes. 27 Important figures in developing the new episte-
mology's view of truths as necessarily partial and contextual include 
the fathers of post-Newtonian physics (Albert Einstein and Max 
Planck), the linguists Benjamin Whorf and Ferdinand de Saussure, 
and Wittgenstein, who rejected the "picture theory" that Truth is an 
objective picture of reality in favor of the view that a multiplicity of 
truths exists as an integral part of culture and context.28 
Note that all these scholars, and most others who were seminal in 
articulating the basic outlook of the new epistemology, are male. This 
history is no news to relational feminists, who regularly cite Wittgen-
stein and others as sources ofinspiration.29 In what sense, then, is this 
vast epistemological shift "feminist" or even "feminine"? The simple 
answer is that the new epistemology is not in any meaningful way 
"women's voice." 
C. Women's Voice and the Critique of Possessive Individualism 
1. The Feminism of Difference as a Resurgence of Domesticity 
The traditional stereotype of women, designed to justify women's 
subservience in a society that saw hierarchies as natural and desirable, 
came during the course of the eighteenth century to seem inconsistent 
with the emerging political philosophy of liberalism, which held all 
males is the historian of science (a scientist herself) Evelyn Fox Keller. See E.F. KELLER, RE-
FLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 61-65 (1985). Keller convincingly argues that the ideol-
ogy of science developed as part and parcel of a new gender system in the early modem era. But 
this does not establish, as she and others seem to assume, that the new epistemology (which is a 
critique of that system of science in the sense that science built upon the tenets of traditional 
epistemology) is "female" in any meaningful sense. 
27. See Williams, supra note 22, at 435-39. 
28. See id. at 439-53. 
29. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 14, at 1374 n.3. 
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men as equal. 30 Gradually a new gender ideology, the ideology of do-
mesticity, developed in which women continued to be viewed as 
weaker than men physically and intellectually, but were newly extolled 
as more moral than men.31 
Gilligan echoes domesticity's "discovery" of women's higher mor-
ality. Unlike the Victorians, Gilligan does not argue explicitly that 
women's morality is of a higher order: she articulates her ideal as a 
"dialectic mixture" of the male and female "voices." Yet commenta-
tors have noted the striking resemblance between Gilligan's ideal mor-
ality ·and her description of female emotional maturity.32 An 
emotionally mature woman, it seems, will reach Gilligan's ideal moral 
state automatically, while men will attain it only through a fundamen-
tal restructuring of their gender identity. 
A close analysis of the traits Gilligan attributes to women suggests 
that she and other scholars who share her view of women offer domes-
ticity with a difference. These "relational feminists,"33 as they have 
been aptly called, reclaim the compliments of Victorian gender ideol-
ogy while rejecting its insults. Thus, relational feminists agree with 
the Victorians that women are more nurturing than men ("focused on 
relationships"), less tied to the questionable virtues of capitalism, and 
ultimately more moral than men. But they disagree with the Victori-
ans' view that women are also more passive than men, less competent, 
more timid and naturally demure. 
Relational feminism has had a pervasive impact on women's his-
tory, and it is a historian of women who has best illustrated its relation 
to the ideology of domesticity. One of the major achievements of rela-
tional feminism in women's history is Suzanne Lebsock's subtle and 
30. See Bloch, supra note 20, at 241 (hierarchy as natural); L. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE 
REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA- 13-15 (1980). Kerber 
describes the initial accommodation between liberalism and gender in the concept of republican 
motherhood. See L. KERBER, supra, at 265-88. 
31. See Baker, The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-
1920, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 620 (1984); N. Corr, supra note 19; Bloch, supra note 20, at 249-50. 
This description is an oversimplification. Domesticity changed the image of white, middle-class 
women, but the older stereotype lived on. It continued to be applied to lower-class women, to 
black women, and to white middle-class women who violated the code of female behavior man-
dated by domesticity. These themes are astutely explored in Hall, "The Mind That Burns in 
Each Body'~· Women, Rape and Racial Violence, and Peiss, "Charity Girls" and City Pleasures: 
Historical Notes on Working-Class Sexuality, 1880-1920, in POWERS OF DESIRE (A. Snitow, c. 
Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983). 
32. See Auerbach, Blum, Smith & Williams, Commentary on Gilligan's In A Different Voice, 
11 FEM. STUD. 149, 156-59 (1985); see also Ehrenreich, Accidental Suicide (Book Review), AT-
LANTIC, Oct. 1986, at 98, 100 (Gilligan's work being used "to re-open the old case for women's 
absolute moral superiority"); Kerber, Some Cautionary Words for Historians, 11 SIGNS: J. Wo-
MEN CULTURE & SOCY. 304, 309 (1986). 
33. Offen, Defining Feminism: A Comparative Approach, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & 
SOCY. 119, 135 (1988). 
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persuasive study of a small Virginia town before the Civil War. In The 
Free Women of Petersburg, Lebsock summarizes her conclusions about 
women's values in the pre-Civil War period as follows:34 
[H]ere, in one list, are the documentable components of a women's value 
system. Women, more than men, noticed and responded to the needs 
and merits of particular persons. This showed in their tendency to re-
ward favorite slaves and to distribute their property unevenly among 
their heirs. It also showed in their ability to make independent judg-
ments about their own fitness to administer estates. Women were partic-
ularly sensitive to the interests of other women and to their precarious 
economic position; this was demonstrated in favoritism toward female 
heirs and in the establishment of separate estates. As their real estate 
and credit transactions suggest, women wanted financial security for 
themselves as well as for others. Beyond that they were not as ego-in-
vested as were men in the control of wealth. Our list grows a bit longer 
if we add the more ambiguous evidence derived from women's vanguard 
action in providing relief to the poor and in promoting religion. Women 
as a group were more invested than were men in Christian communities 
and the life of the spirit. And in their efforts to give assistance to the 
poor, both personalism and regard for other women surfaced again; the 
poor were mainly women and children, most of whom cannot have "de-
served" their poverty. 
The people who wrote the antebellum period's popular literature 
have been trying to tell us all along that women were different from men, 
better than men in some respects. Perhaps it is time we took their 
message more seriously.35 
Lebsock's book, published shortly after Gilligan's, comes to some 
strikingly similar conclusions. 36 Both authors conclude that women 
are more focused on relationships than are men, and both suggest that 
women's is a higher morality. But Lebsock differs from Gilligan, and 
from most other relational feminists, in her awareness that she is re-
claiming stereotypes from domesticity. Unlike scholars who have 
glossed over the Victorians' negative characterizations of women, Leb-
sock confronts them directly, and her conclusions are instructive. She 
asserts that women were not uniformly inept; many were active and 
competent as executors of their husbands' estates. Nor were they pas-
sive as investors; only risk-averse. When it comes to the positive at-
tributes of Victorian gender stereotypes, Lebsock's conclusions differ. 
She concludes that women were characterized by a "personalism" that 
made them more sensitive to slaves, the poor, and vulnerability in 
34. S. LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTH· 
ERN TOWN, 1784-1860 (1984). Lebsock won the prestigious Bancroft Prize for this work. 
35. Id. at 142-43. 
36. Lebsock's research was done over an eight-year period, during which Gilligan also was 
developing her ideas. 
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other women, less involved in capitalist values and (consequently?) 
more moral than men. 
Lebsock thus rejects the insults of Victorian gender ideology but 
embraces those elements complimentary to women. So do most femi-
nists of difference, though few make their selectivity so clear. More-
over, relational feminists often seem unaware of their own selectivity. 
"Perhaps it is time we took [the antebellum] message more seriously," 
Lebsock argues, forgetting the half of the antebellum message she re-
jects. In this she is joined by the majority of relational feminists. 37 
Given the decision to rehabilitate domesticity's gender stereotypes, 
it is not surprising that relational feminists choose domesticity's com-
pliments over its insults. But this veils the deeper question: Why re-
turn to domesticity at all? 
In answer let us start with a telling exchange between Carol Gilli-
gan and Catharine MacK.innon in the 1984 ·~onversation" held at the 
Buffalo School of Law .. 38 In a discussion of Jake, Gilligan's typical 
male, and Amy, her typical female, Gilligan argued that her goal was 
to assimilate Amy's voice into the mainstream of society. MacK.innon 
responded that her goal was more to have Amy develop a new voice, 
one that "would articulate what she cannot now, because his foot is on 
her throat." Gilligan's Amy, said MacK.innon, "is articulating the 
feminine. And you are calling it hers. That's what I find infuriating." 
"No," replied Gilligan, "I am saying she is articulating a set of values 
which are very positive."39 
Note Gilligan's assumption that because what she has found is 
"very positive," she cannot have found "the feminine" - i.e. conven-
tional gender stereotypes derived from domesticity. MacK.innon is 
right that what Gilligan has found is femininity; Gilligan is right that 
there is something positive there. 
37. The one Victorian compliment relational feminists have rejected is the view of women as 
passionless. The classic study of the different cultural meaning of asexuality is Cott, Passionless-
ness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850, in N. Corr & E. PLECK, A 
HERITAGE OF HER OWN (1979). 
38. Conversation between Carol Gilligan and Catharine MacKinnon, Mitchell Lecture Se-
ries, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law (Nov. 20, 1984), reprinted in A 
Conversation, supra note 9, at 11. 
39. Id. 
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2. Domesticity as a Critique of Possessive Individualism 40 
The conventional wisdom among the "sameness" contingent41 is 
that relational feminists in their celebration of women's voice are sim-
ply basking in self-congratulation. I think this misses the mark. Rela-
tional feminists' interest in "the feminine" stems from its 
transformative potential.42 Relational feminists find enshrined in do-
mesticity "female'' values that, they believe, will enable women to 
achieve equality not by buying into the male world on male terms, but 
by transforming the world in women's image. Thus Kathy Ferguson 
in The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy 43 asserts that feminist the-
ory "can provide for a reconceptualization of some of the most basic 
terms of political life."44 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, a leading disciple of 
Gilligan within the legal community, hopes to restructure the legal 
system to express the values of "Portia's" voice.45 Robin West recom-
mends a new focus on connectedness and intimacy.46 Other relational 
feminists go further and argue that women's voice is the best hope for 
40. The term "possessive individualism" comes from C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL 
THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 3, 263-64 (1962). The term refers to the liberal 
premises that society consists of market relations, and that freedom means freedom from any 
relations with others except those relations the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his 
own self-interest. 
41. I don't mean to imply that MacKinnon is one of the "sameness" contingent. She is not. 
See C. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UN· 
MODIFIED 33-45 (1987). The relationship between MacKinnon's viewpoint and relational femi-
nism is aptly capsulized by Robin West. See West, supra note 2, at 15. 
42. Although Gilligan herself sends mixed messages, see infra text accompanying notes 61-
62, her recent comments show that she diverges from many of her followers in a significant way 
on the issue of the transformative potential of "women's voice." She has from the beginning 
acknowledged that both men and women face challenges, though they are different ones, in 
achieving emotional maturity. Men need to appreciate relationships while women need to realize 
that a caring and nurturing outlook should include their own, as well as others', needs. See A 
Conversation, supra note 9, at 35, 45-46. 
43. K. FERGUSON, supra note 17. 
44. Id. at 166; accord Spiegelman, supra note 17, at 422-24. Gilligan herself believes that 
many current institutions would benefit from hearing "women's voice." See, e.g., Comments by 
Carol Gilligan, in A Conversation, supra note 9, at 63. In other contexts, though, she has ac-
knowledged MacKinnon's charge that women's "voice" is the "voice of the victim," as, for ex-
ample, when she argued in In a Different Voice that women need to have more respect for their 
own autonomy. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 151-74; see also Comments by Catherine 
MacKinnon, in A Conversation, supra note 9, at 27. 
45. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 17, at 43. Other commentators have argued that law is 
"male." See, e.g., Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83 
(1980); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LA w 294 (D. Kairys 
ed. 1982). The view of law as "male" comes up repeatedly in some feminist contexts. For an 
intelligent protest, see F. Olsen, The Sex of Law (1984) (unpublished paper given to the Section 
on Women and the Law, American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Jan. 6, 1985). 
MacKinnon appears to agree with the characterization of law as male. See MacKinnon, Femi-
nism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN 
CuLTURE & SocY. 635, 645 (1983). 
46. See West, supra note 2, at 65. 
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the future of the planet. But Suzanne Lebsock, as usual, says it best: 
"If we find that all along women have managed to create and sustain 
countercultures, then the chances increase that as women come to 
power, a more humane social order will indeed come with them."47 
For all these feminists, this "more humane social order" entails a 
new ethic of care48 based on a focus on relationships, not competition; 
on negotiation, not combat; on community, not individual self-inter-
est.49 "What is needed," concludes the early and influential feminist 
of difference Elizabeth Wolgast, "is another model . . . . We need a 
model that acknowledges . . . other kinds of interest than self-inter-
est. "50 A more recent legal feminist echoes this thought, noting his 
aspiration "to transform our polity and its underlying assumptions 
from the alienated world of atomistic competition to an intercon-
nected world of mutual cooperation."51 The model being rejected is 
possessive individualism. 
If we examine the transformation proposed by relational feminists, 
we uncover a critique of this model that dates back to the original . 
version of domesticity. Historians have long known that domestic ide-
ology presented a challenge to the capitalist mainstream of American 
society. Said Daniel Scott Smith in 1973: 
Instead of postulating woman as an atom in competitive society, [the 
Victorians] viewed women as a person in the context of relationships 
with others. By defining the family as a community, this ideology al-
lowed women to engage in something of a critique of male, materialistic, 
market society and simultaneously proceed to seize power within the 
family.52 
In 1977, historian Nancy Cott worked out in detail the way domestic-
ity functioned as an internal critique of capitalism. She linked the in-
47. S. LEBSOCK, supra note 34, at 144. Lebsock's claims are modest: "This is a hopeful 
vision," she continues, "but not necessarily a utopian one; we may be talking about the realm of 
small improvement." Other feminists are more openly utopian. An example is Representative 
Patricia Schroeder's statement that "doing something about women's poverty won't make the 
gender gap disappear. Women will still worry that unless we change the old caveman rules, we 
will all be blown up." O'Reilly, Getting a Gender Message, Time, July 25, 1983, at 12. Other 
feminists are more aggressive in their claims for the transformative potential of women's voice. 
See, e.g., West, supra note 2, at 65. 
48. See N. NODDINGS, supra note 17, passim; Areen, supra note 14. 
49. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 17, at 486-95; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 17, at 50-55; C. 
GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 2_9; West, supra note ·2, at 37. West makes it explicit that she sees 
feminism as the way out ofliberalism (within which category she includes critical legal studies, as 
the "unofficial story"). How feminists differ from critical legal scholars in their yearning for a 
vision of community and connection she makes less clear. 
50. E. WoLGASr, supra note 4, at 156. 
51. Comments of Paul J. Spiegelman, A Conversation, supra note 9, at 36. 
52. Smith, Family Limitation, Sexual Control, and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America, 
in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 37, at 222, 238-39. Cf. N. CHODOROW, supra note 12, 
at 213. 
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vention of domestic ideology with changes in work patterns that 
accompanied the industrial revolution. Cott argued that domesticity 
developed in conjunction with the shift from traditional "task-ori-
ented" work, which mixed labor and leisure, to modem "time-disci-
plined" wage labor, which isolates work both temporally and 
geographically from family life. She argued that domestic ideology set 
up the home as a haven from the heartless world of nineteenth-century 
capitalism. 
In accentuating the split between "work" and "home" and proposing the 
latter as a place of salvation, the canon of domesticity tacitly acknowl-
edged the capacity of modern work to desecrate the human spirit. Au-
thors of domestic literature, especially the female authors, denigrated 
business and politics as arenas of selfishness, exertion, embarrassment, 
and degradation of soul. These rhetoricians suggested what Marx's anal-
ysis of alienated labor in the 1840s would assert, that "the worker ... 
feels at ease only outside work, and during work he is outside himself. 
He is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not 
at home." The canon of domesticity embodied a protest against that 
advance of exploitation and pecuniary values. 53 
Cott's description of domesticity as a "cri de coeur against modem 
work relations" suggests that domesticity has from the beginning func-
tioned as an internal critique of Western capitalism. 54 Gilligan and 
her followers carry on this tradition in their visions of the future that 
extol connection, cooperation, and community (the "values of the 
web") and aspire to overcome competition and self-interest. 55 
Gilligan picks up not only domesticity's claim that women offer an 
alternative to capitalism, but also its stereotype of men as capitalists 
par excellence. "For men," Gilligan asserts, "the moral imperative ap-
pears ... as an injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to 
protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment. 56 By 
labelling as "male" the "morality of rights and noninterference," Gilli-
gan links men with the liberal ideology that underlies American capi-
talism. 57 Gilligan also attributes to men the liberal premise that the 
world is one of "people standing alone,"58 arguing, in effect, that men 
accept liberalism's vision of society as a set of preconstituted individu-
als who choose to associate for limited purposes. Hence Jake, Gilli-
gan's typical male, is "concerned with limiting interference" and 
53. N. Corr, supra note 19, at 67-68; see also c. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: 
THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1977). 
54. N. Corr, supra note 19, at 70; see also Baker, supra note 31, at 620. 
55. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 17, 62-63. 
56. Id. at 100. 
57. Id. at 22. 
58. Id. at 29. 
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places a high value on separation and autonomy.59 Gilligan associates 
the male voice with the pursuit of self-interest, and, therefore, with 
capitalism's central tenet that this pursuit will benefit society as a 
whole.60 
Relational feminism is better understood as a critique of possessive 
individualism than as a description of what men and women are actu-
ally like. Gilligan herself acknowledges this when she refuses to asso-
ciate her "voices" with males and females. 61 Yet Gilligan appears not 
to heed her own warnings on this point, for in the remainder of her 
book she invariably associates men with one voice and women with 
the other, and often makes sweeping statements about the way men 
and women "are."62 Gilligan's inconsistent signals about whether she 
is talking about women or "the feminine" have left relational feminism 
with the potential to be used as a weapon against women. As evidence 
of this, I next tum to the Sears case, a clear example of the perils of 
modem domesticity. 
3. EEOC v. Sears: The Perils of Modern Domesticity 
In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 63 Sears argued successfully that 
women were underrepresented in its relatively high-paying commis-
sion sales positions not because Sears had discriminated against them, , 
but because women lacked "interest" in commission sales. Sears used 
the language of relational feminism to support its core argument that 
women's focus on relationships at home and at work makes them 
59. Id. at 38. 
60. Id. at 35, 79. 
61. Id. at 2. This is a standard disclaimer. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 17, at 483; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 17, at 41. But the disclaimer does not solve the underlying problem. Even if 
one accepts that these descriptions accurately describe gender differences (which I do not, see 
infra text accompanying notes 181-90), neither Gilligan nor her followers explain why men and 
women whose behavior does not adhere to gender stereotypes should be denied the dignity of 
being "real" men or "real" women (which .they are when those with a "different voice" are 
systematically referred to as "women" and those with the other voice are systematically referred 
to as "men"). Although I suspect Gilligan herself might blanch at the practice, some relational 
feminists explicitly police the stereotype of women they advocate by calling "male-identified" any 
feminist who disagrees with their characterization of women. For a polite example, see Littleton, 
supra note 2, at 1280. This kind of gender-policing epithet, parallel to the Victorian use of the 
word "unladylike," makes explicit the assumption that women who do not speak in "women's 
voice" are somehow not "real" women. Note also that part of the power of the modern epithet 
"male-identified" is its assertion that a woman without "women's voice" is a man. This insult 
reflects a gender system that (a) mandates correlation of behavior patterns with genitals and (b) 
consequently admits of only two, consistently dichotomous, behavior patterns. 
There is evidence Gilligan is becoming increasingly uneasy about her claim that "women's 
voice" is gendered. See Comments of Paul J. Spiegelman, A Conversation, supra note 9, at 48. 
62. Nel Noddings is more successful than most relational feminists at following through her 
statement that the "caring" ethics she advocates is available, and in fact practiced, by both men 
and women. See N. NooDINGS, supra note 17, at 2. 
63. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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choose to sacrifice worldly advancement in favor of a supportive work 
environment and limited hours that accommodate their devotion to 
family.64 An unmistakable undertone is Sears' subtle intimation that 
women's sacrifice is limited, since their "different voice" makes the 
fast track unappealing. Women's "ethic of care" enables them to rise 
above the fray, so they are not truly hurt when they are excluded from 
high-powered, competitive jobs in commission sales. 65 
The brilliance of Sears' lawyers lies in their success in enshrining 
gender stereotypes at the core of Title VII. 66 Sears provides a dra-
matic illustration of the power of relational feminism to provide a 
respectable academic language in which to dignify traditional stereo-
types. The. case holds the potential to transform Title VII law in a 
way that pits gender discrimination plaintiffs against stereotypes in a 
battle the stereotypes are designed to win, for in effect Sears establishes 
a legal assumption that all women fit gender stereotypes and imposes 
on plaintiffs a burden to disprove that assumption as part of their 
prima facie case. Understanding the potential impact of Sears requires 
some background in Title VII law. 
The usual focus of a Title VII class action lawsuit is on statistics 
comparing the proportion of women in a given job category with the 
proportion of women in the relevant labor market. Statistics are direct 
proof that a facially neutral hiring policy has a disparate impact on a 
group protected under Title VII. 67 Statistics also are evidence of in-
tent, as is illustrated by the "billiard ball" example. Say one begins 
with a barrel containing 50 black and 50 white billiard balls. If balls 
were removed in a random fashion, one would expect half black and 
half white balls to be chosen. The further the results are from a 50/50 
split, the greater the likelihood some other factor is at work. Because 
defendants who discriminate are rarely open about it, the law helps 
plaintiffs through a presumption that the "other factor" involved is 
discrimination. Thus, courts have required only evidence of a statisti-
cally significant disparity by a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 
64. This argument was made most clearly through the testimony of Rosalind Rosenberg. See 
Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg at paras. 11, 16-22, EEOC 
v. Sears (No. 79·C-4373). Sears' testimony at times made it seem that all women prefer part-time 
work. 
65. See id. at paras. 16-22. Another Title VII defendant successfully used a similar interest 
argument in EEOC v. General Tel. Co. of Northwest, Inc., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1533 
(W.D. Wash. 1985), affd., 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished 
opinion). 
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). 
67. I'm simplifying for clarity. In individual cases, of course, what the relevant labor market 
is can be a subject of hot contention. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATl5TICAL PROOF OF D1s-
CRIMINATION 44-49, 102-41 (1980). 
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of discrimination. 68 Thereafter, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate some nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity 
documented. 69 
In contrast to courts prior to Sears, both the trial and appellate 
Sears courts required the EEOC to prove not only statistical dispari-
ties but also men's and women's "equal interest."70 Under Sears, 
therefore, a class of gender discrimination plaintiffs cannot prove their 
prima facie case simply by proving a disparity between the proportion 
of women in the relevant labor market and the proportion of women 
in the jobs at issue. Instead they have the additional burden of estab-
lishing what percentage of women in the otherwise relevant labor mar-
ket was truly "interested" in the jobs at issue. 
Sears based its argument, first, upon testimony of managers, one of 
whom made the now famous claim that women did not want commis-
sion sales jobs because such salesmen were required to work outside 
the store and women do not like to go out when "it's snowing or rain-
ing or whatever."71 The managers' testimony was bolstered by a soci-
ologist who testified about a survey of Sears employees, 72 by a writer 
on women's issues, 73 and by historian Rosalind Rosenberg, who cited 
Gilligan and other relational feminists to support her assertion that 
the EEOC's "assumption that women and men have identical interests 
and aspirations regarding work is incorrect. Historically, men and 
women have had different interests, goals and aspirations regarding 
work."74 
To support this statement, Rosenberg offered portraits of men and 
women that closely echoed Gilligan's. Women she depicted as "hu-
mane and nurturing," focused on relationships, and averse to capitalist 
virtues such as competition.75 Again echoing Gilligan, she painted 
men as competitive and motivated by self-interest: possessive individ-
68. For a good general discussion, see Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 189; for an 
advanced discussion, see D. BALDUS & J. CoLE, supra note 67, at 26-31, 290-93. 
69. See D. BALDUS & J. CoLE, supra note 67, at 27. 
70. See 628 F. Supp. at 1305-15; 839 F.2d at 320-21. 
71. Trial Transcript at 8439, Testimony of Ray Graham, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 79-C-4373), ajfd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Gra-
ham, Sears' corporate director of equal opportunity, repeatedly expressed the opinion that some 
jobs (hardware, for example) have "natural appeal" for men, id. at 8435, while others (draperies) 
are "a natural" for women, id. at 8432. His assessments were based on assertions tliat women are 
averse to competition, id. at 8433, and pressure, id. at 8434-35. 
72. See EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1308-13. 
73. 628 F. Supp. at 1307. 
74. Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg, at para. 1, EEOC v. 
Sears (No. 79-C-4373). 
75. Id. at paras. 16-22. 
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ualists par excellence. 16 
Sears proceeded to use against women the gender stereotypes reha-
bilitated by relational feminism. 77 The implication of Sears' successful 
use of domesticity's insults is that relational feminists delude them-
selves if they think they can rehabilitate domesticity's compliments 
without its insults. To relational feminists, the key point of domestic-
ity may be women's higher morality; to Sears managers it was that 
women are wea~ and dependent, delicate and passive. 
A closer look at the trial transcript dramatizes the power of these 
stereotypes once unleashed, for it shows how Sears systematically used 
stereotypes to override information about the desires and the aspira-
tions of actual women. The most obvious example of this occurs in 
the testimony of Joan Haworth, Sears' major statistical witness, who 
argued that even female applicants who appeared to be interested in 
commission sales, in fact, were not interested. When the EEOC chal-
lenged this statement, Haworth chose three applications that indicated 
background and experience in commission sales and explained how 
she knew none was truly interested. 78 The EEOC located two of the 
three women Haworth discussed, both of whom testified they had in 
fact been seeking jobs in commission sales. 79 The trial judge glossed 
over this rebuttal in his opinion. 80 
76. Id. 
77. Some thoughtful comments on drafts of this paper have suggested that all Sears proves is 
that relational feminism can be misused. I disagree. The fact that stereotypes drawn from rela-
tional feminism can so successfully be used against women suggests, to me, their inherent limita-
tions (namely, that they were designed to be used against women), not that Rosenberg and 
Nordberg distorted Gilligan's imagery. I want to stress that my charge that Gilligan's descrip-
tion of gender is inaccurate and potentially harmful does not mean that I think feminists should 
stop exploring gender differences, see infra text accompanying notes 181-90; it means only that 
our explorations should break free from the grip of verities derived from domestic ideology. 
In addition to using domesticity's compliments against women, Sears also subtly mobilized 
the insults that are an integral part of the traditional stereotypes. Rosenberg notes women's 
traditional association with dependence, id. at para. 17; Ray Graham's testimony is pervaded by 
notions of women as weak, Trial Transcript at 8425-26, 8436, delicate, id. at 8425, 8439, and 
vulnerable, id. at 8435, 8438, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373). Other managers also stressed 
women's sexual vulnerability, see Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Thomas Biczak at 
para. 26, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373); Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Daniel 
Mihalovich at para. 12, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373). 
78. Trial Transcript at 14625-29, Testimony of Joan Haworth, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79·C-
4373). Haworth was analyzing applications that provided a single box marked "sales" for appli-
cants to check, without a breakdown into commission and noncommission sales. The EEOC's 
analysis incorporated the assumption that female applicants who checked sales and had back-
ground and experience in commission sales were interested in commission sales positions. Sears 
challenged this assumption by putting Haworth on the stand to testify that such women were not 
in fact interested in commission sales. 
79. One stated, "[C]ommission sales is exactly what I was looking for and was the reason I 
came to Sears and put in an application." Written Testimony of Lura L. Nader at 1, EEOC v. 
Sears (No. 79-C-4373). See also Written Testimony of Alice Howland at 4. 
80. Judge Nordberg's opinion discounted these witnesses' testimony on the ground that the 
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·Sears also systematically discounted interests expressed by female 
applicants in "male" jobs such as auto sales. Haworth, who argued 
that those applicants were puffing up their interest, guarded against 
this by "normalizing" the scores of female applicants. Her methodol-
ogy functioned to ensure that sales applicants who indicated interest in 
working both in "male" areas such as auto sales and in "female" areas 
such as the baby department had their "male" interests systematically 
discounted. 81 
Sears' attorneys had help from the trial judge in policing gender 
stereotypes. 82 Judge John A. Nordberg, a Reagan appointee, played 
an active role in shaping the evidence to support his eventual holdings 
that women lack interest in "male" jobs. Whenever EEOC witnesses 
made statements about women's commitment to the home and their 
lack of commitment to wage labor that contradicted gender stereo-
types, Nordberg insisted they specify the precise percentage of women 
EEOC had not proven that they were discriminated against. EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 
1318 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). This of course was not the purpose for 
which these witnesses' testimony was submitted. 
81. This arose in Sears' lawyers' analysis of Sears' Applicant Interview Guides (AIG's), in 
which applicants were asked to rate their interest in selling various categories of items from one 
to five in terms of interest, experience, and skill. In Judge Nordberg's words, "The scores were 
normalized to take into account that some applicants might inflate their scores to increase their 
chances of being hired." 628 F. Supp. at 1322. Normalization is a commonly used statistical 
technique, but two of EEOC's experts testified they had never seen it used as Dr. Haworth used 
it. 
The normalization procedure only registered the applicant in a category if the applicant gave 
herself a rating for each of the three dimensions (interest, skill and experience) that was 125% of 
her average rating for that dimension on all other AIG activities. For example, if an individual 
rated herself four for each of interest, experience, and skill in home improvement, this rating 
would be counted only if her average rating for all other activities covered by the AIGs was not 
greater than 3.2 for each of interest, experience, and skill. This procedure penalized people with 
varied interests and experience. It was therefore likely to penillize women with interest or experi-
ence in nontraditional work unless those women both disclaimed interest in and had never done 
traditional women's work. Thus women's interest in nontraditional work was systematically 
discounted. Consequently, a woman who had held a low-paying sales position of the type in 
which women retail workers are disproportionately concentrated would be likely to have any 
interest she expressed, or experience she had, in commission sales discounted. Since men are less 
likely to have experience or interest in (lower-paying) women's work, their interest in higher-
paying jobs traditionally held by men was much less likely to be discounted. Compare Judge 
Nordberg's analysis, 628 F. Supp. at 1322 n.79, with Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission as Appellant at 41-42, EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
82. Sears also had help from the EEOC. The Agency's decision not to provide testimony 
from victims of discrimination made it much easier for Sears to make general arguments on the 
basis of stereotypes. The EEOC's position is that if it had provided witnesses, the trial judge 
would have discounted their testimony on the grounds that the witnesses were too few in number 
or were otherwise unrepresentative of the nationwide class. Brief of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as Appellant at 151-53, EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
However, the testimony of live women interested in nontraditional jobs might have made it more 
awkward for the courts to accept Sears' assertions about women's interests. Maybe not, of 
course; see supra notes 78-79. But the existence of victim testimony so labelled would at the least 
have required the Seventh Circuit to write its opinion differently. It relied heavily on the lack of 
testimony from "real" victims. See 839 F.2d at 310-12. 
818 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:797 
whose interests diverged from those of women in general (i.e., from 
gender stereotypes). Here's one example from the testimony of histo-
rian Alice Kessler-Harris, who countered Rosenberg's testimony by 
arguing that women generally have taken higher paying jobs when 
they became available despite the mandates of domesticity. 
Could I just interrupt for one second, Dr. Harris, or Kessler-Harris. 
This is what I have said to others, and if you had sat through all the 
testimony, you would understand the reason for my saying this. One of 
the difficulties in analyzing and dealing with the evidence in the case is a 
tendency of witnesses to use the phrase "men and women" as though it 
is 100 percent of men or 100 percent of women. I think that the testi-
mony makes it clear that there are a range of personalities, interests, 
experiences, achievements, and everything in both sexes .... And what 
this case in a sense is getting down to, because of the statistical nature of 
the case, is percentages. It would be very helpful to me during the 
course of your testimony to try to quantify the percentage or the propor-
tion or possible number that you are dealing with in any particular thing 
that you say. I [know] it is hard, because you are, in a sense, seeking to 
generalize. But it makes it very difficult when it is asserted that either 
women so and so or men so and so, when we all know that it isn't 100 
percent correct. 83 
Judge Nordberg repeated the same point as a constant refrain to 
the testimony of EEOC witnesses. Women behave like this, they testi-
fied. What percentage, Nordberg asked again and again.84 When 
Sears witnesses made generalized statements about women that con-
firmed stereotypes derived from domesticity, Nordberg's concern for 
quantification evaporated. I found no instance in which Nordberg felt 
the need for this type of quantification from Sears witnesses. 85 
Nordberg's opinion shows why: he adopted the argument advanced 
by Sears (through Rosalind Rosenberg) that women who did not fit 
conventional stereotypes were a marginal group of (uppity?) college 
women. No statistical evidence supported this assertion. 86 
Nordberg's insistence on quantification in effect required plaintiffs 
to specify the precise percentage of women interested in nontraditional 
83. Trial Transcript at 16501-02, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373). 
84. For example, Nordberg repeated this point to Alice Kessler-Harris six times. Trial Tran-
script, passim, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C.4373). 
85. I have not read the entire 19,000-page transcript. However, I note that Nordberg never 
pressed Sears' complementary witness Rosalind Rosenberg to attach a percentage to her claims 
about women, although those claims often were as unqualified as Kessler-Harris', or more so. To 
Rosenberg, Nordberg stressed the need to qualify her statements by designating the time period 
to which they applied. Trial Transcript at 10374-76, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373). That 
objection was much easier to meet: it is easier for a historian to limit generalized statements to a 
given century than to specify what precise percentage of women during a given period wanted 
nontraditional jobs (or otherwise diverged from women's traditional roles). 
86. See 628 F. Supp. at 1314-15; Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind 
Rosenberg, para. 23, EEOC v. Sears (No. 79-C-4373). 
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jobs such as commission sales. By not requiring Sears to provide 
equivalent proof of the specific percentage of women who fit gender 
stereotypes, the Sears district court opinion in effect establishes a legal 
presumption that all women fit traditional gender stereotypes. The 
Seventh Circuit opinion wholeheartedly adopted this approach. 87 
Sears' doctrinal innovation clashes at a fundamental level with the 
thrust of Title VII. Sears allows information about gender, about 
women as a group, to be used to establish a legal presumption about 
individual plaintiffs consolidated into a class. This is inappropriate be-
cause Title VII is designed to protect women who do not fit gender 
stereotypes, who want to work as physicists, or in auto sales. Title 
VII's underlying goal is to protect women who want nontraditional 
work. Establishing a legal presumption that every class of female 
plaintiffs conforms to gender stereotypes frustrates this goal. 
Sears is thus a dramatic reversal of existing Title VII law and 
should be overruled. From a theoretical standpoint, Sears shows the 
power of gender stereotypes to overshadow evidence about actual 
women. Sears also shows how relational feminism's critique of posses-
sive individualism serves to marginalize both women and the critique 
itself. 
Unlike the critique of capitalism from traditional radical dis-
course, 88 domesticity's critique does not compel its followers to con-
front capitalist practice and to change it. Instead, an abiding tenet of 
domesticity is that women's aversion to capitalist virtues makes them 
"choose" home and family. 89 This is an argument that encourages 
women to "choose" economic marginalization and celebrate that 
choice as a badge of virtue. This analysis of domesticity as an ideology 
designed to enlist women in their own oppression will be more fully 
developed later. 9° For now the important thing is how Sears mobil-
ized domesticity's critique of possessive individualism against women. 
One can see how domesticity's compliments add up to its critique: 
women reject crass competition; they favor a friendly, cooperative, 
working environment over mere material advancement; they value 
their commitments to family over career success.91 Sears' argument 
demonstrates how domesticity's critique of possessive individualism 
87. See 839 F.2d at 320-21. 
88. I use the term "radical discourse" to refer to radical rhetoric in the Marxist tradition. 
This includes both classical Marxism and the neo-Marxist critical theorists. 
89. See infra text accompanying notes 126-33. 
90. See infra text accompanying notes 134-38. 
91. Compare Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg, EEOC v. 
Sears (No. 79-C-4373), at paras. 19(c), 20(a) (women reject competitiveness) and para. 19(a) 
("Women tend to be more interested than men in the cooperative, social aspects of the work 
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rests on a claim that women are psychologically unsuited to the eco-
nomic mainstream. All Sears did was pick this up and use it to argue 
that women are psychologically unsuited to work in commission sales. 
Sears thus illustrates how domesticity's gendered critique of pos-
sessive individualism functions to marginalize the women who espouse 
it. It also shows that domesticity's power derives from its ability to 
make arguments about women's "choice" vaguely complimentary in-
stead of clearly insulting. When defendants prior to Sears tried to mo-
bilize the interest argument, they met with little success because their 
"interest" arguments so clearly mobilized racist or sexist insults. For 
example, the assertion in a 1976 race discrimination case that blacks 
lacked interest in law enforcement evidently smacked too much of a 
claim that blacks are lazy and shiftless, or inherently not law-abid-
ing. 92 In another case, the defendant's argument that women did not 
need the vocational training available to men since women choose un-
skilled jobs anyway also struck a jarring note.93 In both cases, the 
interest argument evidently struck the courts as a blatant attempt to 
use against minorities the insulting stereotypes to which they tradi-
tionally have been subjected. Sears' lawyers succeeded because they 
used against women not the insults but the compliments of domestic-
ity. Once the interest argument was linked with women's virtues, the 
trial judge and the conservative Seventh Circuit found it easier to 
frame complimentary holdings asserting that women choose their rela-
tive poverty, while framing their argument as a paean to female 
virtue.94 
If Sears contains some disturbing messages for relational feminists, 
it also contains a comforting one: that by giving up domesticity's cri-
tique of possessive individualism, they are abandoning a singularly in-
effective critique. A key source of the attraction of "women's voice" 
for feminists and other progressive thinkers is that, in a society where 
radicals have had trouble being taken seriously, relational feminism 
offers a critique of capitalism that avoids the perceived stridency of 
traditional radical discourse. It is Marxism you can take home to 
mother.95 But, as Sears shows, this strength is also a weakness, for 
situation.") with para. 10 ("Even as they have entered the labor force in increasing numbers, 
women have retained their historic commitment to the home."). 
92. Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930, 936 (D. Mass. 1971). 
93. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1086-88 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ajfd. sub nom. Cor-
nish v. Johnson, 774 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 
94. See EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1307-08 (N.D. Ill. 1986); 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
95. This phrase was first applied to Antonio Gramsci. See Romano, But Was He a Marxist? 
(Book Review), VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 29, 1983, at 41, quoted in Lears, The Concept of Cultural 
Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM. Hlsr. REV. 567 (1985). 
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what domesticity offers is a singularly "domesticated" critique that ac-
cepts the notion that anyone who rejects the values of contemporary 
capitalism freely chooses to eschew the spoils of capitalist endeavor. 
As traditional radical discourse makes clear, the whole point of 
critiquing capitalism is to challenge the. way in which wealth is created 
and distributed. Domesticity's critique is designed to evade the central 
issue of whether society should be transformed. 
D. Conclusion 
Lebsock offered a balanced assessment of relational feminism when 
she noted that the "emphasis on gender differences has great promise 
and great strategic risks. The risks derive from the difficulty we have 
in thinking in genuinely egalitarian terms .... The promise lies farther 
off."96 With Sears, the risks associated with relational feminism have 
been played out. Moreover, I have argued that the promise of rela-
tional feminism, its critique of possessive individualism, is fundamen-
tally flawed. Plenty of less dangerous, nongendered critiques exist to 
help progressives in their search for words against the resurgence of 
classical economic liberalism: The ongoing fascination with republi-
canism offers a possible altemative.97 Neither this approach, nor 
traditional radical discourse - nor, for that matter, standard New 
Deal rhetoric - holds the pitfalls of relational feminism. 98 Instead of 
rehabilitating inherently loaded stereotypes, contemporary feminists 
96. S. LEBSOCK, supra note 34, at 144. 
97. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REv. 3 (1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1983); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitu-
tional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: 
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 767. For critiques of possessive individ-
ualism not framed in gendered terms, see R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, w. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER 
& S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 
275-96 (1985); Cornell, Toward a Modem/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. 
REv. 291 (1985); Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 567 (1983); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1417 (1984); Simon, The Inven-
tion and ReinventiOn of Welfare Rights, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1985); Sparer, Fundamental Human 
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509 (1984). I find it particularly disturbing when feminists 
cite ungendered critiques and characterize them as "feminine." See, e.g., Sherry, supra, at 543-
44. Indeed, Hendrik Hartog has argued that, to the extent republicanism is gendered, it is patri-
archal. See Hartog, remarks in a round table discussion on The Constitution, Republicanism, 
and Women in the New Nation, at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the American Society for 
Legal History, Oct. 23-24, 1987. The only overlap I can see between Sherry's description of 
republicanism and that of the "femiru'he voice" is that both constitute critiques of liberal individ-
ualism. This overlap does not make republicanism "feminine." See also Schneider, supra note 
17, at 612-13 (discussing parallels between feminist theory and Sparer's nongendered critiques of 
capitalism). 
98. See Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CUL-
TURE & SocY. 644 (1987). 
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should follow through domesticity's insights into the gendered struc-
ture of American capitalism to their logical conclusion. This follow-
ing section begins that process. 
II. CHALLENGING THE GENDERED STRUCTURE OF WAGE LABOR 
The challenge to "male norms" offered by the feminism of differ-
ence is comprised of two quite different elements. The first is the cri-
tique of "male" behavior and values, which in essence is the critique of 
possessive individualism. A second element is the critique of men's 
traditional life patterns. Like the first, this second critique has tradi-
tionally been linked with domesticity, but it need not be. In this sec-
tion, I present an analysis that challenges the desirability of men's 
traditional life patterns without linking the critique to domestic 
ideology. 
A rejection of men's traditional life patterns entails a fundamental 
challenge to the structure of wage labor. In articulating such a chal-
lenge, I begin from Catharine MacKinnon's analysis of gender as a 
system of power relations.99 While I disagree with many of MacK.in-
non's conclusions, 100 her initial premise is a powerful one: that ine-
qualities of power are the core feature of the gender system as we 
know it. MacK.innon and her followers have explored the implica-
tions of this insight primarily in the context of sexuality. Here I turn 
to a more conventional topic, and analyze the Western wage labor sys-
tem as a system of power relations that leaves women economically 
and socially vulnerable. 
Western wage labor is premised on an ideal worker with no child 
care responsibilities. 101 In this system men and women workers are 
99. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN - A CASE OF 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 92, 101-29, 21S-21 (1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT]; c. MAC-
KINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-42 (1987) [hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]. 
100. See infra text accompanying notes 17S-80. 
101. I would like to thank Ann Freeman for insights and encouragement in developing this 
· argument, of which she has a somewhat different version. Mary Joe Frug has articulated the 
core insight that Western wage labor assumes a worker with no child care responsibilities in her 
seminal study, Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working 
Mothers, S9 B.U. L. REv. SS (1979). 
Note that I am not arguing that I have provided a full explanation of gender dynamics. 
Other commentators have analyzed other parts of the gender system, notably Catharine Mac-
Kinnon in her work on the social construction of sexuality. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, 
at 8S-92. 
Scholars outside the law, notably Zillah Eisenstein, also have developed analyses that overlap 
with the one presented here. See z. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMI-
NISM (1981); Eisenstein, The Sexual Politics of the New Right: Understanding the "Crisis of 
Liberalism" for the 1980s, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOCY. S67 (1982). Although Eisen-
stein's analysis is insightful, I question her assumption that a change in the structure of wage 
labor necessarily entails a wholesale abandonment of liberalism and capitalism. Wage labor 
could be restructured to eliminate the conflict between wage labor and reproduction while leav-
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allocated very different roles. Men are raised to believe they have the 
right and the responsibility to perform as ideal workers. 102 Husbands 
as a group therefore do far less child care, and earn far more, than 
their wives. Women are raised with complementary assumptions. 
They generally feel that they are entitled to the pleasure of spending 
time with their children while they are small. Moreover, even upon 
their return to work, the near-universal tendency is to assume that 
women's work commitment must be defined to accommodate continu-
ing child-care responsibilities. 103 
This gender system results in the impoverishment of women, since 
it leads mothers systematically to "choose" against performing as ideal 
workers in order to ensure that their children receive high-quality 
care. The phenomena that comprise the gender system today are often 
noted, but the way the system functions as a coherent whole remains 
largely hidden.104 The following analysis will show how the impover-
ishment of women upon divorce, the feminization of poverty, and to 
some extent the wage gap between men and women, are all parts of a 
dynamic that leads to the systematic impoverishment of women. 
Before the industrial revolution, both men and women engaged in 
economic production, and though women were viewed as inferior, a 
certain fluidity existed between men's and women's roles. 105 This situ-
ation changed with the shift from task-oriented to time-disciplined la-
bor in the late eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, men's 
and women's roles were sharply differentiated. Under the new gender 
system, married women ordinarily experienced utter financial depend-
ing intact the basic premise of decentralized production fueled by "private" capital. Moreover, 
while I recognize that one approach to redefining the ideal worker is to redefine liberalism's 
demarcation between the public and private spheres by making child care a state responsibility, 
in my view this approach fails to address the fact that an 8- to 10-hour workday often does not 
leave enough time for effective parenting. 
102. I do not mean that all men choose to be ideal workers, just that men as a group gener-
ally feel it is their right to be ideal workers if they so choose. Individual variation remains 
important: some men do decide to scale back their career aspirations in order to spend more 
time with their families. 
103. Although in the text I focus on child care, women also shqulder a disproportionate 
share of the housework. See Burros, Women: Out of the House But Not out of the Kitchen, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 1. 
104. What I describe here are only the most recent developments of a long-standing pattern. 
See Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of 
Housework, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Socv. 366, 371-73 (1981). 
105. See L. ULRICH, supra note 20, at 14-50. Actually, as Ulrich explains, while women 
could perform male activities so Jong as they were acting under the supervision and authority of 
their husbands, men did not similarly cross over and perform women's activities. This is the 
classic pattern, today best illustrated by patterns of dress: it is easier to persuade the dominant 
group to share its privileges with the subservient group than it is to persuade the dominant group 
to threaten its status by adopting behaviors associated with subservience. In short, real women 
may wear tuxedos, but real men do not wear high heels. 
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ence on their husbands, though a divorceless society protected wives 
from destitution so long as they stayed. with their husbands and -
perhaps more to the point - their husbands stayed with them. 
This gendered division of labor had a certain logic during the colo-
nial era, when the average white woman got pregnant once every 24 
months, and had an average of more than seven live births.106 In addi-
tion, childbirth was hazardous and frequently incapacitated women 
for substantial periods.107 Marriage made biological reproduction a 
full-time job for most married women, even assuming that the house-
hold did not produce what it consumed, which many households 
did. 108 Under these conditions the blanket assumption that married 
women were not suitable for life-long careers of time-disciplined labor 
may not have been far from the truth. 
Since colonial times, childbirth has become safer and birth rates 
have fallen precipitously, 109 yet the structure of wage labor remains 
unchanged. Meanwhile, divorce rates have risen at an astonishing 
rate. In 1870, 8 percent of marriages ended in divorce; today 48 per-
cent of all marriages do, and half of all American children will experi-
ence family disruption by age eighteen.110 This has created a new 
dynamic within the traditional gender system that makes the system 
more repressive than at any other time in its history. 111 While women 
are keeping their side of the gender bargain, by "choosing" to 
marginalize themselves economically in order to allow their husbands 
to perform as ideal workers, many men no longer are honoring their 
commitment to support their mates and children. Divorced men in 
106. The first figure is for women in New England. See New England: The Little Common-
wealth, in THE LEGACIES BOOK: A COMPANION VOLUME TO THE AUDIOCOURSE LEGACIES: 
A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA, 1607-1870, at 32 (E. Pleck & E. Roth· 
man eds. 1987). The second figure is for all American white women. See J. LEAVITT, BROUGHT 
TO BED 14 (1986); Smith, supra note 52, at 226. Leavitt points out that the standard statistic 
refers to live births, which implies a substantially greater number of pregnancies to account for 
stillbirths and miscarriages. 
107. See J. LEAVITT, supra note 106, at 13-35. 
108. See Gordon & Buhle, Sex and Class in Colonial and Nineteenth-Century America, in 
LIBERATING WOMEN'S HISTORY 279-84 (B. Carroll ed. 1976). The development of a market 
economy worked to disrupt household production by the end of the eighteenth century. Id. at 
283. See also H.R. HAYS, THE DANGEROUS SEX 270 (2d ed. 1972). 
109. See Smith, supra note 52, at 226-27. 
110. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 215 (1985); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (108th ed. Supp. 
1988); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE: 1867-1906, at 13 (1909). 
111. See T. ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE 150-60 (1986) (comprehensive look at the 
gender bias in divorce). It should be emphasized again that the gender system has always served 
to transfer wealth from women to men: the developments discussed here are only the most 
recent. See.Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More 
Progressive Union, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION 15-19 (L. Sargent ed. 1981). 
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massive numbers pay little or no alimony or child support. 112 Under 
these conditions, women's choice to eschew "ideal worker" status for 
the sake of their children often leads to impoverishment of their chil-
dren as well as themselves. 1 I3 
The impoverishment of previously married women parallels the 
pattern among single mothers. With the breakdown of sexual taboos, 
increasing numbers of mothers are never married to the fathers of 
their children. These unwed fathers tend to play even less of a role in 
financial support of their children than do divorced fathers. 114 
The wage gap, a third crucial element in the feminization of pov-
erty, also appears to stem in part from the gendered distribution of 
wage labor and child-care responsibility. 115 Economists employing 
"human capital" theory have argued that the wage gap is attributable 
not to discrimination but to women's choices.116 One study has esti-
mated that roughly half of the wage gap between men and women is 
attributable to factors that, upon inspection, relate to women's child-
care responsibilities. These factors include differences in work experi-
ence, work continuity, and ability to work full time and during ill-
112. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 110, at 143-83, 262-322 (1985); Pearce, Welfare Is Not for 
Women: Toward a Model of Advocacy To Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 412, 413-14 (1985). 
113. The impoverishment of middle- and working-class women upon divorce is a tragedy 
with striking potential for changing cultural norms, as women come to realize that they need to 
be empowered to perform as ideal workers to protect not only their own futures, but those of 
their children. "Legislation can only go so far," said New York family court Judge Emily Jane 
Goodman. "No divorce reform will be successful until women have economic independence. 
Women need to concentrate on being financially independent before, during and after marriage." 
Blair, Women Who Divorce: Are They Getting a Fair Deal?, WOMAN'S DAY, May 27, 1986, at 
36', 45. 
114. Unwed fathers are almost as likely to pay formal child-support awards, but the annual 
awards are much lower in amount ($1147 compared to $2538). Moreover, many fewer never-
married mothers than divorced mothers are granted child-support awards (19% compared to 
82%). U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY, 
ADVANCED DATA FROM MARCH-APRIL 1986, CURRENT POP. SURVEYS (Series P-23, No. 152) 
(Aug. 1987). Note that experts caution that formal child-support awards are not a good indica-
tor of responsibility among fathers, since they do not count informal gifts of money and non-
monetary help, such as child care. Conversation with Gina Adams, Children's Defense Fund, 
Aug. 25, 1988; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, ADOLESCENT AND YOUNG ADULT FATHERS, 
May 1988. 
115. See WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGRE-
GATION (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan eds. 1976); SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, 
EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES (B. Reskin ed. 1984); Beller, Occupational Segregation and the Earn-
ings Gap, in COMMN. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE SO'S, at 23-33 
(1984); Bums, Apologia for the Status Quo (Book Review), 74 GEO. L.J. 1791, 1798 (1986); Frug, 
supra note 101, at 57-61; Kingston, Women in the Law Say Path is Limited by Mommy-Track, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (professional jobs "off the fast track"). 
116. See c. LLOYD & B. NIEMI, THE EcONOMICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIALS 88-150 (1979); 
Polachek, Discontinuous Labor Force Participation and Its Effect on Women's Market Earnings in 
SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 90 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975); see also B. BERG-
MANN, THE EcONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 25 (1986) (criticizing these theories). 
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nesses of the worker or other family members. 117 (Note that even 
were we to agree that women "choose" disproportionate child-care re-
sponsibilities, human capital theorists themselves implicitly acknowl-
edge that such choices cannot account for all of the wage gap. Their 
own estimates leave 55 percent of the wage gap unexplained. This 
percentage may reflect discrimination.118) 
In fact, both discrimination against women and women's 
"choices" must be seen as elements of an integrated system of power 
relations that systematically disadvantages women. Women's choices 
show the system's success in persuading women to buy into their own 
economic marginalization. Openly discriminatory treatment based on 
the notion that "women should stay at home" shows how gender ide-
ology serves to police the gender system by eliminating options that 
would loosen the grip of gender roles. In sum, women's choices show 
how women perpetuate the gender system themselves; discrimination 
shows how others join them in policing the gender system. 
The impoverishment of women that results from the current gen-
der system has been well documented. 119 Lenore Weitzman has 
shown that women experience a 73 percent decline in their standard of 
living in the year after divorce; men experience a concomitant 42 per-
cent rise in living standards.120 Statistics on the feminization of pov-
erty also are well known. Three out of every five people with incomes 
below the poverty line are women. 121 Three-fourths of all black fami-
lies below the poverty line are headed by women.122 Two out of every 
three poor elderly people are women. 123 Almost one in three female-
headed households is poor; only about one in eighteen male-headed 
households is. 124 The average income of female-headed families is less 
than half that of male-headed families. Moreover, families composed 
117. See c. LLOYD & B. NIEMI, supra note 116, at 79-80. 
118. See id. at 204-0S. See also R. TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 3S-4S (1974). 
119. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 110, at 337-S6; see also R. EISLER, DISSOLUTION: No-
FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 20-S4 (1977); Levin, Virtue Does 
Not Have Its Reward far Women in California, 61 WOMEN LAW. J. SS, S7 (197S); Prager, Shift-
ing Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUES-
TIONS 111, 123 (B. Thorne & M. Yablom eds. 1982). Betty Friedan has played a role in 
popularizing the issue. See, e.g., B. FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY LIFE 32S-26 (1976); Friedan, 
supra note 8, at 98. 
120. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 110, at 337-S6. See also Burtless, Comments on Income for 
the Single Parent: Child Support, Work, and Welfare, in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE 263 (C, 
Brown & J. Pechman eds. 19~7); Blair, supra note 113, at 36. 
121. Eisenstein, The Sexual Politics of the New Right: Understanding the "Crisis of Liber-
alism" for the 1980s, reprinted in FEMINIST THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 77 (1981). 
122. Pearce, supra note 112, at 413. 
123. Eisenstein, supra note 121, at 91. 
124. Figures for households not headed by females are from the National Advisory Council 
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of women and children are ten times more likely to stay poor than are 
families where a male is present.12s 
The feminization of poverty reflects the way the gendered labor 
system invented at the time of the Industrial Revolution has adapted 
to modem conditions. In a world where many more women than ever 
before are raising children without significant financial assistance from 
men, the gender system has taken on a more repressive dynamic than 
at any time since its invention. 
Why is this so difficult to see? In large part because of the ideology 
that women's disadvantaged position results from choices made by 
women themselves. Alexis de Tocqueville offered an early version of 
this argument over a century ago. 
In America, a woman loses her independence forever in the bonds of 
matrimony. While there is less constraint on girls there than anywhere 
else, a wife submits to stricter obligations. For the former, her father's 
house is a home of freedom and pleasure; for the latter, her husband's is 
almost a cloister . 
. . . [Yet, the American woman] herself has freely accepted the yoke. 
She suffers her new state bravely, for she has chosen it.126 
The modem form of this argument is the contemporary celebration 
of women who either subordinate their careers or abandon them alto-
gether because they "know their own priorities." "[A] woman 
shouldn't have to apologize for her priorities," said Betty Friedan in a 
recent interview on "sequencing," i.e., women dropping out of profes-
sional life for the period when their children are young. 127 News arti-
cles on "sequencing" seem invariably to point to women such as Jeane 
J. Kirkpatrick, Sandra Day O'Connor, and D.C. Circuit Chief Judge 
Patricia Wald, each of whom took from five to fifteen years off to stay 
home with young children.128 Only occasionally do these articles note 
that such women are the exception.129 I suspect most women would 
take years off their careers if they could be griaranteed that upon their 
return they could become an ambassador to the United Nations, a 
in Economic Opportunity study, which reported that 39% of all female-headed households live 
under the poverty line. See Blair, supra note 113, at 40. 
125. Pearce, supra note 112, at 413. 
126. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 568 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds. 
1966). 
127. See Rimer, supra note 7. 
128. See, e.g., Fierst, supra note 7, at 62-63; Rimer, supra note 7. 
129. See, e.g., Rimer, supra note 7. See also Torry, Female Lawyers Face Persistent Bias, 
ABA Told, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, at Al, A4 ("women are not increasing their representation 
among partnerships, judgeships and tenured law faculty positions in nearly the percentages their 
numbers and class rank would indicate" in part due to the fact "they are forced to sacrifice career 
advancement ••• to have children"). 
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Supreme Court Justice, or a D.C. Circuit Court judge - just as many 
men (and women) would take time off for a stint as an artist, a carpen-
ter, or a ski bum if they could be offered the same assurance. But most 
"sequencers" are not so lucky. In the words of one company execu-
tive, "From a total career standpoint, anyone has to realize the reali-
ties of a big hiatus in their career - that it is certainly going to slow it 
down."130 (And this executive worked for a company that is actively 
seeking to hire reentering women - what do the executives of compa-
nies say who refuse to hire such women?) 
There is growing evidence that a career hiatus, at least in some 
professions, does not merely slow women down, but places them per-
manently in a second-class, relatively low-paid "mommy track."131 
This development has received particular attention in the law. One 
recent article notes the "frightening possibility" that law firms will 
evolve into institutions "top-heavy with men and childless women, 
supported by a pink-collar ghetto of mommy-lawyers," often with per-
manent associate status. 132 
The professional who removes herself from the fast track is only 
part of the syndrome by which women systematically "choose" eco-
nomic marginalization. Probably the more important aspect of the 
phenomenon is the tendency among women to select jobs that will 
allow them to fulfill their "family responsibilities," even if such jobs 
pay less and offer less opportunity for advancement.133 
These two phenomena are an integral part of the economic 
marginalization of women. Decoded, the current talk about women's 
priorities is a translation into new language of domesticity's old argu-
ment that women's values lead them to make different choices. The 
persistence of this classic argument makes it imperative for feminists 
to analyze why the argument has abiding persuasiveness. The ap-
proach most useful to an analysis of women's "choice" is Antonio 
Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony.134 Gramsci painted a com-
130. Rimer, supra note 7. See also sources cited supra notes 115-18. 
131. See Kingston, supra note 115; Hickey, supra note 7, at 59. 
132. Hickey, supra note 7, at 59. 
133. See Fuchs, Sex Differences in Economic Well-Being, SCIENCE, Apr. 26, 1986, at 459, 
462-63; Frog, supra note 101, at 55-59; K. GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE 
ABOUT WORK, CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD 92-122 (1985); P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, 
AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 325-26 (1983); S. HEWLETI, A LESSER LIFE: THE 
MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 18-47 (1986); INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY 
RESEARCH, UNNECESSARY LossES 10 (executive summary) (1988) (new mothers' annual earn-
ings and hours of employment are lower than those of women without babies). 
134. Good introductions to Gramsci are A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON 
NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & G. Smith eds. & trans. 1971); w. ADAMSON, HEGEMONY AND 
REVOLUTION: A STUDY OF ANTONIO GRAMSCl'S PoLmCAL AND CULTURAL THEORY (1980); 
J. CAMMETI, ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND THE ORIGINS OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM (1967); A. DA-
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plex picture of how the dominant culture rules with the consent of the 
governed by shaping a "hegemony" of values, norms, perceptions, and 
beliefs that "helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, dis-
courages the clarification of social alternatives, and makes it difficult 
for the dispossessed to locate the source of their unease, let alone rem-
edy it."13s 
Gramsci's thought suggests that feminists can approach women's 
culture as a system of cultural hegemony. Marxist feminists have long 
argued that domesticity is a capitalist tool to privatize the costs of 
workers at the expense of women for the benefit of the employers.136 
Gramsci's analysis offers needed subtlety by focusing on the complexi-
ties surrounding women's consent. For Gramsci consent is a complex 
state fraught with ambiguities, a "'contradictory consciousness' mix-
ing approbation and apathy, resistance and resignation."137 
Gramsci's analysis of consent suggests that feminists must come to 
terms with the ways in which women's culture 'has served to enlist 
women's support in perpetuating existing power relations. As histo-
rian T.J. Jackson Lears has expressed it: 
The idea that less powerful folk may be unwitting accomplices in the 
maintenance of existing inequalities runs counter to much of the social 
and cultural historiography of the last fifteen years, which has stressed 
the autonomy and vitality of subordinate cultures. Discovetjng nearly 
inexhaustible resources for resistance to domination, many social histori-
ans have been reluctant to acknowledge the possibility that their subjects 
may have been muddled by assimilation to the dominant culture - per-
haps even to the point of believing and behaving against their own best 
interests.138 ' 
Women's historians and other femillists have illustrated this reluc-
tance. In their effort to do justice to the dignity of women, they re-
soundingly rejected the image of women as victims, and instead have 
celebrated women's "nearly inexhaustible resources for ·resistance."139 
Now that this refusal to see women as victims has been transposed 
into a blame-the-victim argument through the rhetoric of choice, there 
is an acute need for a more balanced view of women's culture. A bal-
VIDSON, ANTONIO GRAMSCI: TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (1977); J. FEMIA, 
GRAMSCI'S PoLmCAL THOUGHT (1981); T. NEMETH, GRAMSCI'S PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL 
STUDY (1980). 
135. Lears, supra note 95, at 569-70. 
136. This has long been noted by Marxists. See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 111, at 28; see 
also Harding, What Is the Real Material Base of Patriarchy and Capital?, in WOMEN AND 
REVOLUTION 130 (L. Sargent ed. 1981). 
137. Lears, supra note 95, at 570. 
138. Id. at 573 (footnote omitted). 
139. Id. 
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anced perspective could be achieved by synthesizing two distinct peri-
ods of women's history that thus far have remained remarkably 
resistant to such synthesis. 
Before the mid-1970s, many women's historians concentrated on 
documenting how domesticity cramped women's lives.140 This early 
focus on how domesticity oppressed women was replaced after 1975 
by a revisionist movement initiated by Carroll Smith-Rosenberg's in-
fluential article entitled The Female World of Love and Ritual: Rela-
tions Between Women in Nineteenth-Century America. 141 Smith-
Rosenberg's article began a celebration of nineteenth-century women's 
culture, as historians explored the close emotional ties as well as the 
empowering aspects of women's separate sphere.142 This literature, 
which developed simultaneously with Gilligan's feminism and echoed 
its celebration of women's different voice, takes on new meaning when 
it is combined with the earlier literature documenting the oppressive 
aspects of nineteenth-century women's culture. To put it bluntly, 
women's rich emotional relationships in their disempowered sphere 
and the seductive compliments of domesticity - in particular, the no-
tion that women were more moral than men 143 - encouraged women 
to "choose" their own repression. This analysis need not deny the 
positive elements of women's culture. But it does demonstrate the 
need to assess how those positive elements sought to enlist women in 
their own oppression, and the extent to which that effort has been suc-
cessful. Sears showed how traditionalist judges can use women's cul-
ture against women. The more troubling question is the extent to 
which women use it against themselves, as they do every time a wo-
man "chooses" to subordinate her career "for the good of the family" 
and congratulates herself on that choice as a mature assessment of her 
own "priorities."144 
140. See e.g., Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 152 (1966). 
A sampling of other representative works: Faragher & Stansell, Women and Their Families on 
the Overland Trail to California and Oregon, 1842-1867, 2 FEM. STUD. 150 (1975); Smith-Rosen-
berg, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in 19th-Century America, 39 Soc. 
RE.s. 652 (1972); Wood, The "Scribbling Women" and Fanny Fern: Why Women Wrote, 23 AM. 
Q. 3 (1971). Welter and other contemporary writers of women's history were directly influenced 
by Betty Friedan's The Feminist Mystique. See Kerber, supra note 2, at 11. Kerber offers an 
astute reassessment of women's history designed to move beyond the stages I discuss here. 
141. Smith-Rosenberg, The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between Women in 
Nineteenth-Century America, reprinted in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 37, at 311. 
142. See Kerber, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
143. It should be noted that the notion that women are more moral than men offered women 
real power in the nineteenth century, something I would argue it does not do today. See Ginz-
berg, "Moral Suasion Is Moral Balderdash'~· Women, Politics, and Social Activism in the 1850s, 
73 J. AM. H1sr. 601 (1986). 
144. I do not mean to imply that all women who take primary child care responsibility at the 
expense of their ability to be ideal workers do so because they are persuaded by domesticity's 
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Feminists need to arm women to resist the argument that women's 
economic marginalization is the product of their own choice. Chal-
lenging this argument should be easy, since, in fact, in our deeply 
gendered system men and women face very different choices indeed. 
Whereas women, in order to be ideal workers, have to choose not to 
fulfill their "family responsibilities," men do not. 145 The question 
women ask themselves is this: Should I make professional sacrifices 
for the good of my children? In order for the wife's "choice" to be 
equivalent to her husband's, she would first have to be in a position to 
ask herself whether or not she would choose to be an ideal worker if 
her husband would choose to stay home with the children. Second, 
she would have to pose the question in a context where powerful social 
norms told her he was peculiarly suited to raising children. When we 
speak of women's "choices" to subordinate their careers, we are so 
blinded by gender prescriptions that we can forget that the husband's 
decision to be an ideal worker rests upon the assumption that his wife 
will choose not to be in order to allow him that privilege. This is true 
whether the wife eschews a career altogether or whether (in the mod-
ern pattern) she merely subordinates her career to child-care responsi-
bilities.146 The point is that the husband is doing neither.147 Women 
know that if they do not sacrifice no one will, whereas men assume that 
if they do not, women will. 
Thus women do not enjoy the same choices as men. But the un-
derlying point is a deeper one: that society is structured so that every-
reassurance that their choice places them on a higher moral plane. Many no doubt settle for 
part-time work or make other trade-offs with the sense that they are making the best of a bad 
bargain through a temporary expedient not desirable but inevitable under the circumstances. Yet 
my sense is that the societal message that women are inherently more nurturing and self-sacrific-
ing, and less competitive and ambitious, often plays a role in helping persuade women that what 
is inevitable is also "natural" and desirable. 
145. This is the case primarily because, despite the entry of large numbers of mothers into 
the workplace, most fathers have not taken on significantly more home responsibilities. Thus 
their wives are left trying to perform as ideal workers and to provide the support services their 
husbands require in order to perform as ideal workers. See C. TAEUBER & V. VALDISERA, 
WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN EcoNOMY 7-8 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Reports, Series p-23, No. 146, 1986). As many news articles testify, this is 
impossible. See, e.g., Hickey, supra note 7, at 40-45; Salho!z, supra note 8. 
146. In a recent Gallup poll, 28% of working and 57% of nonworking mothers said they had 
quit work since having children; 43% of working and 37% of nonworking mothers said they had 
changed jobs or hours to spend more time with family; 35% of working and 45% of nonworking 
mothers said they had cut back on career goals. Kantrowitz, Witherspoon, Burgower, Weathers 
& Huck, A Mother's Choice, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 31, 1986, at 46, 51. 
147. The power of gender is such that even where the husband's job has the flexibility to 
accommodate substantial child-care responsibilities, whereas the wife's job does not, the wife 
often ends up making professional sacrifices to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the child 
care. For example, when the husband is an academic and the wife works in a law firm, the wife 
nonetheless often jeopardizes her chances for partnership by working part-time in order to take 
primary child·care responsibility. See Kingston, supra note 115, at 1. 
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one, regardless of sex, is limited to two unacceptable choices-men's 
traditional life patterns or economic marginality. Under the current 
structure of wage labor, people are limited to being ideal workers, 
which leaves them with inadequate time to devote to parenting, and 
being primary parents condemned to relative poverty (if they are sin-
gle parents) or economic vulnerability (if they are currently married to 
an ideal worker). Wage labor does not have to be structured in this 
way. 
The increasing onerousness of the gender system makes a chal-
lenge to the structure of wage labor a priority of the highest order. 
Moreover, a historic opportunity exists for a challenge: the current 
revolution in wage labor itself. 
This revolution is not that women work; women have always 
worked. 148 The change is that the majority of mothers now engage in 
wage labor. 149 In 1890, only 2.5 percent of married white women did 
so,150 but 59 percent of married women do today, including 51 percent 
of those with children under three, and 54 percent of those with chil-
dren under six.151 Not only have married women gone out to work, 
but the social taboos against such work, a crucial policing mechanism 
of domestic ideology, also are disappearing. 152 The shift in the tradi-
tional assumption that mothers will not work outside the home is en-
capsulated in the recent welfare reforms. 153 
148. See A. KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED (1981); A. KESSLER-
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK (1982). Kessler-Harris' title illustrates the difficulty of trying to be 
consistent about not referring to wage labor as "work," a usage that implies that women's tradi-
tional activities, from bearing children to housework, are leisure. 
149. Working Mother Is Now Norm, Study Shows, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1988, at Al9. 
150. Smith, supra note 52, at 225. Married black women have always worked outside the 
home in greater numbers. See J. JONES, LABOR OF LovE, LABOR OF SORROW 6-8 (1985). 
Moreover, the figure for white women has been challenged, see, e.g., Bose, Devaluing Women's 
Work: The Undercount of Women's Employment in 1900 and 1980, in HIDDEN AsPECTS OP 
WOMEN'S WORK 95 (Women and Work Research Group ed. 1987), as have the presumptions 
that generate it, see Turbin, Beyond Conventional Wisdom: Women's Wage Work, Household 
Economic Contribution, and Labor Activism in a Mid-Nineteenth Century Working-Class Com-
munity, in To TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY, supra note 20, at 47, 54-56. 
151. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OP THE 
UNITED STATES 383 (1987). The equivalent figures for 1970 were 40%, 26%, and 31%. B. 
BERGMANN, supra note 116, at 25. Women's labor-force participation in their prime child-rais-
ing years (ages 25 to 34) increased from 34.4% to 63.8% between 1954 and 1979. "Between 
1950 and 1978, the labor participation rates of mothers with children under six more than trip-
led, rising from 14 percent to 44 percent." Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of 
Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249, 1254 (1983). The percentage of married women with 
children under one who worked outside the home more than doubled between 1970 and 1985. 
See Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1, 18 n.66 (1987). 
152. B. BERGMANN, supra note 116, at 3-4; P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, supra note 133, 
at 117-27 (suggesting ambivalence on the issue). 
153. See Stevens, The Welfare Consensus, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, at 4, col. 5. 
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This massive shift in the gendered distribution of wage labor has 
produced intense pressures to challenge the assumption that the ideal 
worker has no child care responsibilities. But this pressure is being 
evaded by a cultural decision to resolve the conflicts between home 
and work where they have always been resolved: on the backs of 
women. In the nineteenth century, married women "chose" total eco-
nomic dependence in order to fulfill family responsibilities. 154 Today, 
many women with children continue to make choices that marginalize 
them economically in order to fulfill those same responsibilities, 
through part-time work, "sequencing," the "mommy track" or 
"women's work." 155 In each case, the career patterns that accommo-
date women's child-care responsibilities often are ones that hurt 
women's earning potential. 
Day care, widely assumed to be the key to incorporating mothers 
into the labor force, 156 is part of the emerging gender system that rein-
forces women's traditional condemnation to the margins of economic 
life, for even mothers with day care cannot truly perform as ideal 
workers. The ideal worker is one who can work a minimum of 40 
hours a week and has no career interruptions (such as time Ol!t for 
childbirth, infant care, or care of the sick)157 and who can do the 
things required for "normal" career advancement - which frequently 
include the ability to work overtime and the willingness to travel and 
(for white-collar jobs) to be transferred to a different city. Employers 
are taught they can expect this, but mothers cannot fulfill this career 
profile even with most types of day care - the single exception may be 
154. Professions often enforced women's "choice" with formal rules that required married 
women to discontinue work. See, e.g., M. ROSSITER, WOMEN SCIENTISTS lN AMERICA 15-16 
(1982) (A promising female physics professor was forced to resign by Barnard in 1906, upon 
becoming engaged. Her career ended, although her engagement did not ultimately result in 
marriage.). 
155. See H. KAHNE, RECONCEIVING PART-TIME WORK 24-60 (1985); s. SHARPE, DOUBLE 
IDENTITY: THE LIVES OF WORKING MOTHERS 54-63 (1984); Kingston, supra note 115, at 1; 
Rimer, supra note 7; Hickey, supra note 7, at 59. See also sources cited supra note 133. The ten 
leading occupations of women are ones in which it is relatively easy for workers to leave and 
reenter. See Marshall & Paulin, Employment and Earnings of Women: Historical Perspective, in 
WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FuTuRE 10, 24 (1987). 
156. See, e.g., Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALUS 607, 
630 (1964); R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AF-
FLUENT AMERICA 131 (1980). Rossi has changed her view, and has turned to sociobiology to 
support her new argument that women are "naturally" more suited to "mothering." Rossi, A 
Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, DAEDALUS, Spring 1977, at l, 4-5; Rossi, Gender and 
Parenthood, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 1, 9 (1984). 
I do not mean to sound negative about day care, which is an inevitable {and probably desira-
ble) part of a total solution. My only point is that day care by itself is a solution that reinforces 
the marginalization of women. 
157. See Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 381-84 (1984-85). 
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the mother with a full-time housekeeper, a solution available only to 
the relatively rich.158 
The child-care options available to the great bulk of workers often 
require someone to take time. from work when the child or the care-
taker is sick or for other appointments that must take place during 
business hours. 159 Moreover, many day care centers and many family-
care situations offer sharply limited hours that do not accommodate 
many employers' requirements for overtime work.160 So long as 
mothers systematically take up the slack, the traditional gender system 
will not change: mothers will remain at the margins of economic life. 
And 85 percent of all working women are likely to become mothers 
during their working years.161 
Women can work without insisting on a redefinition of the ideal 
worker, but most can do so only at the cost of failing to fulfill the 
ideal. This is not happening. Consequently, what we are seeing today 
is the adjustment of the gender system to these new conditions in a 
way that ensures women's continued relegation to the margins of eco-
nomic life. We are living through a reinvention of the gender system, 
when we as feminists should be proposing a paradigm shift162 that en-
tails a redesign of wage labor to take parenting activities into account. 
There are three basic options for changing the status quo. One is for 
each individual woman to rebel against the traditional demand that 
she sacrifice in order for her husband to be an ideal worker. But what 
will that mean: that she will become the ideal worker and he will play 
the supportive role? This is an alternative most men would find un-
thinkable because they are socially conditioned to believe that the op-
158. In Washington, D.C., admittedly an inflated market, the average price for a full-time 
nanny is $225-$250 per week, according to estimates by nanny services. See Shannon, WASH· 
INGTONIAN, Oct. 1988, at 171. They place the range from $150 per week to $350 per week, in 
addition to a fee of between $300 and $1200 due to the nanny agency as a finder's fee. Id. at 171-
72. 
159. Many employees' sick leave policies do not allow them to take sick leave to care for sick 
children, and many states' licensing laws do not allow children with communicable diseases to be 
in day care. Even where licensing requirements do not forbid it, most centers (for obvious rea· 
sons) have policies forbidding sick children to attend. Telephone conversation with Barbara 
Reisman, Child Care Action Campaign (Dec. 16, 1988). 
160. Many centers have policies charging parents $1 per minute for each minute they are 
late. Although this is understandable from the viewpoint of the child-care workers, it imposes a 
burden on parents whose employers require them to work overtime. These include not only 
professional workers, but others. For example, postal workers are required by collective bargain· 
ing agreement to work up to two hours overtime with no advance notice. Telephone conversa· 
tion with Barbara Reisman, Child Care.Action Campaign (Dec. 16, 1988). See COALITION OF 
LABOR UNION WOMEN, BARGAINING FOR CHILD CARE (1985). 
161. S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING 
WOMEN 5 (1983). 
162. Cf. Kerber, supra note 2, at 27. 
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tion to be an ideal worker is their birthright. Most women, moreover, 
would find this option unattractive because society has nourished in 
them the belief that it is their birthright to be able to take time off the 
grind and enjoy their children while they are small. 
A second alternative is for both men and women to give a little, so 
that they share the family responsibilities that preclude ideal worker 
status. But then neither husband nor wife functions as an ideal worker 
- a risky strategy in an age of economic uncertainty.163 
The only remaining alternative is to challenge the structure of 
wage labor. Since the current structure, and the gender system of 
which it is a part, increasingly condemns women to poverty, this 
should be at the core of a feminist program.164 
Such a program would build upon many reforms 'that currently 
exist. These include programs such as day care, flex-time, and four-
.day work weeks, 165 organized labor contracts that provide for uncon-
ditional personal days that can be used for care of sick children, 166 as 
well as paid maternity leave (for the physical disability associated with 
childbirth) and parental leave.167 More sweeping proposals are those 
offered by noted child care specialists Benjamin Spock and Penelope 
163. Both these options are doomed politically, as is any political strategy that attempts to 
gain equality for women by insisting men share women's traditional disabilities. This strategy 
has been tried before, with notably unsuccessful results. An example is the Victorian attempt to 
eliminate the sexual double standard by insisting that men join them in adhering to the sexual 
purity expected of women. Modern reformers have been careful to disassociate advancements for 
women from sacrifices for men. For example, the Equal Pay Act requires that salary disparities 
be remedied by raising women's salaries, not lowering men's. See Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56 
(1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)), discussed in Coming Glass Works v. 
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190-91, 195-204 (1974). · 
In addition, it is likely that men face even greater career difficulties than women when they 
demand accommodation of child-care responsibilities. See Project, Law Firms and Lawyers with 
Children: An Empirical Analysis of Family/Work Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1263, 1300 (1982). 
164. For an examination of various policy approaches, see Frug, supra note 101, at 61-103; 
Taub, supra note 157, passim. (Taub contends that various sorts of work leaves should be avail-
able for caretaking responsibilities other than parental ones. Id. at 383-84.) To the extent to 
which employers are changing job expectations to accommodate child-care responsibilities, these 
changes are commonly thought of as special accommodations to women. See, e.g., Collins, Woo-
ing Workers in the 90's: New Role for Family Benefits, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at Al. This 
will not change until feminists challenge the assumption that men, but not mothers, are entitled 
to perform as ideal workers simply because of their sex. Moreover, some evidence exists that 
such "accommodations to women" are occurring primarily in underpaid "women's jobs." See 
Brown & Peckman, Introduction, in GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 120, at 8. 
165. See Collins, supra note 164, at Al, Al4. This article, based on research from a non-
profit group, notes that c<'>mpanies will have to offer "family benefits" in coming years in order to 
attract workers, since two-thirds of all new entrants into the work force will be women. The 
same organization reports that 3500 companies offer some form of child-care support. 
166. See generally CoALIDON OF LABOR UNION WOMEN, supra note 160. 
167. See Collins, supra note 164, at Al4. Parental leave bills introduced in the lOOth Con-
gress were not enacted into law. H.R. 925, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Family and Medical 
Leave Act); S. 2488, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Parental and Medical Leave Act). 
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Leach,168 and by noted economist Heidi Hartmann, who advocates a 
six-hour work day for all workers. 169 
Feminists' goal must be to redesign wage labor to take account of 
reproduction. Such a goal today seems utopian - but then the eight-
hour work day seemed utopian in the mid-nineteenth century.170 The 
notion that the wage-labor system should take account of the human 
life cycle has always faced the argument that such "private costs" as 
aging or raising children are of no concern to employers. Even in the 
United States, this view has been successfully challenged: old age is 
now acknowledged as a reality, and wage-labor expectations have been 
modified accordingly. That, too, once seemed a utopian goal. 171 But 
expectations change: hegemony is never complete. Feminists should 
begin to work both towards cultural change and towards the kind of 
small, incremental steps that will gradually modify the wage-labor sys-
tem to acknowledge the reality of society's reproductive needs. 
Ill. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE 
This section pursues two themes that will be crucial in refocusing 
the debate within feminism away from the destructive battle between 
"sameness" and "difference" towards a deeper understanding of gen-
der as a system of power relations. I first argue that despite the force 
of Catharine MacK.innon's insight that gender involves disparities of 
power, her rejection of the traditional feminist ideal of gender-neutral-
ity rests on misconceptions about this traditional goal, whose core aim 
is to oppose rules that institutionalize a correlation between gender 
and sex. Thus the traditional goal is not one of gender blindness; the 
goal instead is to deinstitutionalize gender, a long and arduous process 
that first requires us to see through the seductive descriptions of men 
and women offered by domesticity. I conclude the article by arguing 
that to the extent these descriptions offer an accurate description of 
168. "Go after our industries!" advises Doctor Spock. He recommends more flexibility in 
hours, six-hour work days and subsidized day care. Both Penelope Leach, a psychology Ph.D., 
and Dr. T. Barry Brazelton believe that current trends have potentially adverse psychological 
consequences for today's families. Brazelton has stressed the need for improved pay for day care 
workers; Leach advocates extensive paid maternity leave (6 months) and part-time work by both 
parents (next 18 months). See Work and Families, WASHINGTON PARENT 1, 3, 5 (Nov. 1988) 
(report of a panel discussion in Boston, Apr. 1988). See also Brazelton, Stress for Families To-
day, INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J., Spring 1988, at 65. 
169. See Hartmann, Achieving Economic Equity for Women, in WINNING AMERICA: IDEAS 
AND LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1990s, 99 (M. Raskin & c. Hartman, eds. 1988). 
170. "In 1840, the average work week in the United States was 78 hours.'' Frug, supra note 
101, at 97 n.248 (citing Northrup, The Reduction in Hours, in HOURS OF WORK (C. Dankert, F. 
Mann & H. Northrup eds. 1965)). 
171. See A. EPSTEIN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AGED vii (1976); see also c. MEYER, SO-
CIAL SECURITY:. A CRmQUE OF RADICAL REFORM PROSPECTS 9 (1987). 
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gender differences, they merely reflect the realities of the oppressive 
gender system. Beyond that, the description is unconvincing. 
A. From Gender-Neutrality to Deinstitutionalizing Gender 
"Sameness" feminists' focus on the similarities between individual 
men and individual women led them to advocate "gender-neutral" 
categories that do not rely on gender stereotypes to differentiate be-
tween men and women. Recent feminists have challenged the tradi-
tional goal of gender neutrality on the grounds that it mandates a 
blindness to gender that has left women in a worse position than they 
were before the mid-twentieth-century challenge to gender roles. 
This argument has been made in two different ways. Scholars such 
as Martha Fineman have argued that liberal feminists' insi.stence on 
gender-neutrality in the formulation of "no-fault" divorce laws has led 
to courts' willful blindness to the ways in which marriage systemati-
cally helps men's, and hurts women's, careers.172 Catharine MacKin-
non has generalized this argument. She argues that because women 
are systematically disadvantaged by their sex, properly designed reme-
dial measures can legitimately be framed by reference to sex.173 
MacKinnon's "inequality approach" would allow for separate 
standards for men and women so long as "the policy or practice in 
question [does not] integrally contribute[] to the maintenance of an 
underclass or a deprived position because of gender status:"174 The 
strongest form her argument takes is that adherence to gender roles 
disadvantages women: Why let liberal feminists' taboo against differ-
ential treatment of women eliminate the most effective solution to 
inequality? 
This debate is graced by a core truth and massive confusion. The 
core truth is that an insistence on gender neutrality by definition pre-
cludes protection for women victimized by gender. 
The confusion stems from the use of the term gender neutrality. 
One could argue that problems created by the gendered structure of 
wage labor, or other aspects of the gender system, should not be reme-
died through the use of categories that identify the protec~ed group by 
reference to the gender roles that have disadvantaged them. For ex-
ample, one could argue that workers whose careers were disadvan-
172. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 
Wis. L. REv. 789, 791; Levin, supra note 119, at 55. See also Finley, supra note 4, at 1148-63. 
173. SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 99, at 100-41 (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)); FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 99, at 35-36. 
174. SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 99, at 117. See Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1686 (1980). 
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taged by choices in favor of child care should not be given the 
additional support they need to "catch up" with their former spouses, 
on the grounds that the group protected inevitably would be mostly 
female, and this could reinforce the stereotype that women need spe-
cial protections. Yet I know of no feminist of any stripe who makes 
this argument, which would be the position of someone committed to 
gender neutrality. 
Traditionally, feminists have insisted not upon a blindness to gen-
der, but on opposition to the traditional correlation between sex and 
gender. MacKinnon's crucial divergence is that she accepts the use of 
sex as a proxy for gender. Thus MacKinnon sees nothing inherently 
objectionable about protecting workers who have given up ideal 
worker status due to child-care responsibilities by offering protections 
to women. 115 Her inequality approach allows disadvantages produced 
by gender to be remedied by reference to sex. This is in effect an ac-
ceptance and a reinforcement of the societal presumption that the so-
cial role of primary caretaker is necessarily correlated with possession 
of a vagina. 
MacK.innon's approach without a doubt would serve to reinforce 
and to legitimize gender stereotypes that are an integral part of the 
increasingly oppressive gender system. Let's focus on a specific exam-
ple. Scholars have found that the abolition of the maternal presump-
tion in child-custody decisions has had two deleterious impacts on 
women.176 First, in the 90 percent of the cases where mothers re-
ceived custody, 177 mothers often find themselves bargaining away fi-
nancial claims in exchange for custody of the children. Even if the 
father does not want custody, his lawyer often will advise him to claim 
it in order to have a bargaining chip with which to bargain down his 
wife's financial claims. Second, the abolition of the maternal prefer-
ence has created situations where a father who wants custody often 
wins even if he was not the primary caretaker prior to the divorce -
on the grounds that he can offer the children a better life because he is 
richer than his former wife. In these circumstances, the ironic result 
of a mother's sacrifice of ideal worker status for the sake of her chil-
dren is that she ultimately loses the children. 
While these results are no doubt infuriating, do they merit a return 
175. SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 99, at 122-24. 
176. See Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Cus-
tody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235 (1982); L. WEITZMAN, supra note 110, at 
217, 310-18. 
177. See Polikoff, supra note 176, at 236. Fathers now win an estimated one-half to two-
thirds of all custody battles. See Salholtz, supra note 8, at 59. 
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to a maternal presumption, as MacK.innon's approach seems to imply? 
No: the deconstruction of gender, by highlighting the chronic and in-
creasing oppressiveness of the gender system, demonstrates the unde-
sirability of the inequality approach, which would reinforce the gender 
system in both a symbolic way and a practical one. On a symbolic 
level, the inequality approach would reinforce and legitimize the tradi-
tional assumption that childrearing is "naturally" the province of 
women. MacK.innon's rule also would reinforce gender mandates in a 
very concrete way. Say a father chose to give up ideal worker status in 
order to undertake primary child care responsibility. MacK.innon's 
rule fails to help him, because the rule is framed in terms of biology, 
not gender. The result: a strong message to fathers that they should 
not deviate from established gender roles. MacKinnon's rule operates 
to reinforce the gender system. · 
What we need, then, is a rule that avoids the traditional correlation 
between gender and sex, a rule that is sex- but not gender-neutral. The 
traditional goal, properly understood, is really one of sex-neutrality, 
or, more descriptively, one of deinstitutionalizing gender. 178 It entails 
a systematic refusal to institutionalize gender in any form. This ap-
proach mandates not an enforced blindness to gender, but rather a 
refusal to reinforce the traditional assumption that adherence to gen-
der roles flows "naturally" from biological sex. Reinforcing that as-
sumption reinforces the grip of the gender system as a whole. 
For an example that highlights the distinction-between gender neu-
trality and deinstitutionalization, let us return to our "divorce revolu-
tion" example. It is grossly unfair for courts suddenly to pretend 
that gender roles within marriage do not exist once a couple enters the 
courtroom, and the deinstitutionalization of gender does not require it. 
What is needed is not a gender-neutral rule but one that avoids the 
traditional shorthand of addressing gender by reference to sex. 
This analysis shows that the traditional commitment, which is re-
ally one to deinstitutionalizing gender rather than to gender neutrality, 
need not preclude rules that protect people victimized by gender. Peo-
ple disadvantaged by gender can be protected by properly naming the 
group: in this case, not mothers, but anyone who has eschewed ideal 
178. Experts agree. See Polikoff, supra note 176, at 237. See also Kay, supra note 151, at 24, 
79. 
The term "deinstitutionalizing gender" is Alison Jaggar's. Jaggar, On Sexual Equality, 84 
ETHICS 275, 276 (1975). Jaggar's position appears to have changed. See A. JAGGAR, supra note 
21, at 148. 
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worker status to fulfill child-care responsibilities.179 One court, moti-
vated to clear thinking by a legislature opposed to rules that addressed 
gender disabilities by reference to sex, has actually framed child-cus-
tody rules in this way.180 
The traditional goal is misstated by the term "gender neutrality." 
The core feminist goal is not one of pretending gender does not exist. 
Instead, it is to deinstitutionalize the gendered structure of our society. 
There is no reason why people disadvantaged by gender need to be 
suddenly disowned. The deconstruction of gender allows us to protect 
them by reference to their social roles instead of their genitals. 
B. Deconstructing Difference 
How can this be done? Certainly the hardest task in the process of 
deconstructing gender is to begin the long and arduous process of see-
ing through the descriptions of men and women offered by domestic-
ity. Feminists need to explain exactly how the traditional descriptions 
of men and women are false. This is a job for social scientists, for a 
new Carol Gilligan in reverse, who can focus the massive literature on 
sex stereotyping in a way that dramatizes that Gilligan is talking about 
metaphors, not actual people.181 Nonetheless, I offer some thoughts 
179. Of course, most of those protected will be women, and that in itself will reinforce the 
notion that women "are really different but we're not allowed to say so." 
Though this is a drawback of sex-neutral standards, it does not obviate the need for them. 
Such standards are useful because they address pressing social issues without bowing to a central 
tenet of gender ideology, namely that gender roles are necessarily correlated with biology, and 
without penalizing men who choose to play gender roles ordinarily assigned to females. 
Nonetheless sex-neutral standards designed to address gender-produced disabilities have very 
real limitations: they no doubt will tend to reinforce the connection between biology and gender 
in people's minds. This limitation simply highlights the need to link short-term solutions, such 
as sex-neutral protections for those disadvantaged by gender, with a long-term strategy challeng-
ing basic tenets of the gender system as a whole. 
180. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-63 (W. Va. 1981), cited in Williams, The 
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 
175, 190 n.80 (1982). 
181. For a recent survey of studies on sex differences, see I. FRIEZE, J. PARSONS, P. JOHN· 
SON, D. RUBLE, & G. ZELLMAN, WOMEN AND SEX ROLES: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PER· 
SPECTIVE 45-68 (1978). For a readily accessible survey of the literature, see Taub, Keeping 
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. 
REV. 345, 349-61 (1980). 
Although this is not the place to do it, it is also time to bring up out of the footnotes law 
reviews' treatment of the numerous and cogent critiques of Gilligan's methodology and conclu-
sions. See, e.g., Auerbach, Blum, Smith & Williams, supra note 32; Broughton, Women's Ration-
ality And Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral 
Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597 (1983); Flanagan & Adler, Impartiality and Particularity, SO Soc. 
REs. 576 (1983); Kerber, Greeno, Maccoby, Luria, Stack & Gilligan, On In a Different Voice: 
An Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SocY. 304 (1986); Nails, Socia/-
Scientific Sexism: Gilligan's Mismeasure of Man, 50 Soc. RES. 643 (1983). The interesting thing 
from a cultural standpoint is how little impact these critiques have made on the widespread 
acceptance of Gilligan's theories. 
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on Gilligan's central imagery: that women are focused on relation-
ships while men are not. As I see it, to the extent this is true, it is 
merely a restatement of male and female gender roles under the cur-
rent gender system. Beyond that, it_ is unconvincing. 
This is perhaps easiest to see from Gilligan's description of men as 
empty vessels of capitalist virtues - competitive and individualistic 
and espousing liberal ideology to justify this approach to life. Gilli-
gan's description has an element of truth as a description of gender: it 
captures men's sense of entitlement to ideal worker status and their 
gendered choice in favor of their careers when presented with the 
choice society sets up between child-care responsibilities and being a 
"responsible" worker. 
Similarly, Gilligan's central claim that women are more focused on 
relationships reflects gender verities. It is true in the sense that 
women's lives are shaped by the needs of their children and their hus-
bands - but this is just a restatement of the gender system that has 
traditionally defined women's social existence in terms of their hus-
bands' need to eliminate child-care and other responsibilities that de-
tract from their ability to function as ideal workers. And when we 
speak of women's focus on relationships with men, we also reflect the 
underlying reality that the only alternative to marriage for most 
women - certainly for most mothers - has traditionally been pov-
erty, a state of affairs that continues in force to this day. 182 
The kernel of truth in Gilligan's "voices," then, is that Gilligan 
provides a description of gender differences related to men's and 
women's different roles with respect to wage labor and child care 
under the current gender regime. Yet we see these true gender differ-
ences through glasses framed by an ideology that distorts our vision. 
To break free of traditional gender ideology, we need at the simplest 
level to see how men nurture people and relationships and how women 
are competitive and powerful. This is a task in which we as feminists 
will meet considerable resistance, both from inside and outside the 
feminist movement. 
Our difficulty in seeing men's nurturing side stems in part from the 
word "nurture." Although its broadest definition is "the act of pro-
moting development or growth,"183 the word derives from nursing a 
baby, and still has overtones of "something only a mother can do." 
Yet men are Involved in all kinds of relationships in which they pro-
mote another's development in a caring way: as fathers, as mentors, as 
182. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 39. MacKinnon has begun the task of diffusing 
the "naturalness" of gender stereotypes about women. 
183. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (William Morris ed. 1970). 
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camp counselors, as boy scout leaders. These relationships may have a 
somewhat different emotional style and tone than do those of women 
and often occur in somewhat different contexts: that is the gender 
difference. 184 But a blanket assertion that women are nurturing while 
men are not reflects more ideology than reality. 
So does the related claim that women's voice involves a focus on 
relationships that is lacking in men. Men focus on relationships, too. 
How they can be said not to in a culture that deifies romantic love as 
much as ours does has always mystified me. Perhaps part of what 
resonates in the claim that men do not focus on relationships is that 
men as a group tend to have a different style than do women: whereas 
women tend to associate intimacy with self-disclosure, men tend not 
to. 185 This may be why women forget about the role that relationships 
play in men's lives, from work relationships, to solidarity based on 
spectator sports, to time spent "out with the boys."186 These relation-
ships may not look intimate to women, but they are often important to 
men. 
Ideology not only veils men's needy side, it also veils the competi-
tive nature of many women who want power as avidly as men. "Femi-
nists have long been fiercely critical of male power games, yet we have 
often ignored or concealed our own conflicts over money, control, po-
sition, and recognition .... It is time to end the silence."187 The first 
step, as these authors note, is to acknowledge the existence of competi-
tion in women's lives. Women's desire for control may be exercised in 
running "a tight ship" on a small income, in tying children to apron 
strings, or in nagging husbands - the classic powerplay of the power-
less.188 Note how· these examples tend to deprecate women's desire for 
power. These are the stereotypes that come to mind because they con-
firm. the ideology that "real" women don't need power. These are 
ways women's yearning for power has been used as evidence against 
them, as evidence they are not worthy as wives, as mothers, or as 
184. See E. WOLGAST, supra note 4, at 129 ("The kind of nurturing given may be sex-differ-
entiated, then, while nurturing is not."). Nonetheless, feminists of difference often tend to as-
sume that nurturing belongs to women in the sense that it is part of "women's voice.'' See, e.g., 
Auerbach, Blum, Smith & Williams, supra note 32, at 158. 
185. See Rubin & Shenker, Friendship, Proximity, and Self-disclosure, 46 J. PERSONALITY 1-
22 (1978). 
186. The irony is that, as recently as twenty years ago, male bonding was celebrated. Per-
haps the celebration of women's culture can be viewed as a response by women who as young-
sters were informed (as I was) that women were too petty and competitive to enjoy the kind of 
deep and lasting friendships males experienced. See E. L. RANELAGH, MEN ON WOMEN (1985). 
187. COMPETITION: A FEMINIST TABOO? 1 (V. Miner & H. Longino eds. 1987). 
188. Literature provides a rich source of examples of men as nurturers and women as power-
hungry, for those of us who are not sociologists. See, e.g., P. ROSE, PARALLEL LIVES: FIVE 
VICTORIAN MARRIAGES 8-9 (1983). 
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women. Feminists' taboo against competition has only reinforced the 
traditional view that real women don't need power.189 Yet women's 
traditional roles have always required them to be able to wield power 
with self-confidence and subtlety. Other cultures recognize that deal-
ing with a two-year-old is one of the great recurring power struggles in 
the cycle of human life. But not ours. We are too wrapped up in 
viewing childrearing as nurturing, as something opposed by its nature 
to authoritative wielding of power, to see that nurturing involves a 
sophisticated use of power in a hierarchical relationship. The differ-
ences between being a boss and a mother in this regard are differences 
in degree as well as in kind. 
Moving ever closer to the bone, we need to reassess the role of 
power in relationships based on romantic love. The notion that a mar-
riage involves complex ongoing negotiations over power may seem 
shocking. But if we truly are committed to a deconstruction of tradi-
tional gender verities, we need to stop blinding ourselves to nurturing 
outside the home and to power negotiations within it. 190 
CONCLUSION 
The first message of this article is that feminists uncomfortable 
with relational feminism cannot be satisfied with their conventional 
response: "When we get a voice, we don't all say the same thing." 191 
The traditional focus on how individuals diverge from gender stereo-
types fails to come to terms with gender similarities of women as a 
group. I have tried to present an alternative response. By taking gen-
der seriously, I have reached conclusions very different from those of 
the relational feminists. I have not argued that gender differences do 
not exist; only that relational feminists have misdescribed them. 
Relational feminism, I have argued, can best be understood as en-
compassing two critiques: the critique of possessive individualism and 
the critique of absolutes. Both are better stated in nongendered terms, 
though for different reasons. Feminists are simply incorrect when 
189. Id. 
190. For an insightful analysis, see id. at 8-9. We need also to beccime more self-conscious 
about how ideological influences make our interpretations highly selective. Note that we hear 
incessantly that ten-year-old girls establish best friend relationships whereas boys band together 
for games. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 12, at 9-11; Maccoby, Social Groupings in Child-
hood: Their Relationship to Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Boys and Girls, in DEVELOP-
MENT OF ANTISOCIAL AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: REsEARCH, THEORIES, AND lssUES (D. 
Olwens, J. Block & M. Radke-Yarrow eds. 1986); Shreve, supra note 17, at 15. Maccoby's study 
is cited to prove that women focus on relationships whereas men focus on competition, an inter-
pretation that ignores the important bonding that occurs in team sports as well as the intensely 
competitive jockeying that accompanies the school-age battle for desirable "best friends." 
191. Comments of Ellen Du Bois, in A Conversation, supra note 9, at 73. 
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they claim the critique of absolutes as women's voice, since that cri-
tique has been developed by men, and its ideal is different from the 
traditional stereotype of women as emotional and illogical. 
Relational feminism's linkage of women to the critique of posses-
sive individualism is trickier. If all relational feminists claim is that 
elite white men are disproportionately likely to buy more completely 
into the ideology that controls access to wealth, in one sense this is 
true. I would take it on faith that a higher proportion of elite white 
males buy into possessive individualism than do black males, working 
class and poor males, or women of all groups. Indeed, in the last 
twenty years writers have documented that these marginalized groups 
have developed their own cultures that incorporate critiques of main-
stream culture. 192 "One very important difference between white peo-
ple and black people is that white people think you are your work,'' a 
black informant told an anthropologist in the 1970s. "Now a black 
person has more sense than that .... " 193 Marginalized groups neces-
sarily have maintained a more critical perspective on possessive indi-
vidualism in general, and the value of wage labor in particular, than 
did white males who had most to gain by taking the culture's domi-
nant ideology seriously.194 Moreover, the attitude of white women 
towards wage labor reflects their unique relationship with it. Tradi-
tionally, married white women, even many working-class women, had 
a relationship to wage labor that only a very few leisured men have 
ever had: these women viewed wage labor as something that had to 
prove its worth in their lives, because the option not to work remained 
open to them psychologically (if, at times, not economically). 
Fewer blacks and women have made the virtues of possessive indi-
vidualism a central part of their self-definition, and this is a powerful 
force for social change. But blacks as a group and women as a group 
have these insights not because they are an abiding part of "the" black 
family or of women's "voice." These are insights black culture and 
women's culture bring from their history of exclusion. We want to 
preserve the insights but abandon the marginalization that produced 
them: to become part of a mainstream that learns from our experi-
192. See, e.g., Janeway, Women and the Uses of Power, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE (H. 
Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1985). 
193. J.L. GWALTNEY, DRYLONGSOUL: A SELF-PORTRAIT OF BLACK AMERICA 173-74 
(1981), quoted in S. Harley, "When Your Work Is Not Who You Are": The Development of a 
Working-Class Consciousness Among Afro-American Women, Paper given at the Conference 
On Women in the Progressive Era, sponsored by the American Historical Association in con-
junction with the National Museum of American History (Mar. 10-12, 1988). 
194. See generally THE NEW HlsTORY: THE 1980s AND BEYOND (T. Rabb & R. Rotberg 
eds. 1982). 
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ence. The Sears case shows how these insights' transformative poten-
tial can easily backfire if the critiques can be marginalized as 
constitutive of a semi-permanent part of the black or female 
personality. 
Relational feminists help diffuse the transformative potential of the 
critique of possessive individualism by championing a gendered ver-
sion of that critique. The simple answer is that they should not say 
they are talking about women if they admit they aren't. Once they 
admit they are talking about gender, they have to come to terms with 
domesticity's hegemonic role in enlisting women in their own 
oppression. 
The approach of deconstructing gender requires women to give up 
their claims to special virtue. But it offers ample compensation. It 
highlights the fact that women will be vulnerable until we redesign the 
social ecology, starting with a challenge to the current structure of 
wage labor. The current structure may not have been irrational in the 
eighteenth century, but it is irrational today. Challenging it today 
should be at the core of a feminist program. 
The message that women's position will remain fundamentally un-
changed until labor is restructured is both a hopeful and a depressing 
one. It is depressing because it shows that women will remain eco-
nomically vulnerable in the absence of fundamental societal change.195 
Yet it is hopeful because, if we heed it, we may be able .to unite as 
feminists to seize the opportunity offered by mothers' entry into the 
work force, instead of frittering it away rediscovering traditional (and 
inaccurate) descriptions of gender differences. 
195. Feminists have Jong realized that "[a]chieving sex-based equality requires social move-
ment for transformation of the family, child-rearing arrangements, the economy, the wage labor 
market, and human consciousness." Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955, 956 (1984). 
